



SPECIAL EDITION

No. 02-12

AUG 02

AFTER-ACTION REPORT (AAR) **SFOR7 – CITIZEN-SOLDIERS IN BOSNIA**



Transcripts from the 49th Armor Division (TXARNG) AAR

**CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U. S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1350**



FOREWORD

The 49th Armored Division, Texas Army National Guard (49th AD)'s mission produced an abundance of information and lessons that can assist follow-on forces based on the 49th AD's deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The soldiers of the National Guard task force participated in a history-making and precedent-setting event that had world-wide visibility. While many factors influenced the unit's preparation for this mission, key elements included exceptional readiness, initiative, and the self-sacrifice of the soldiers and their families. This newsletter will help your unit prepare and understand your requirements if deployed to Bosnia. It contains tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) from all phases from training to demobilization.

This newsletter also contains transcripts from briefings presented by the commander and staff of the 49th Armor Division, Texas Army National Guard, at an After-Action Review (AAR) held at Camp Mabry, Austin, Texas, from 26 - 27 January 2001. The 49th AD assumed command and control of Stabilization Force - 7th rotation or SFOR 7.

If your unit has identified lessons learned or TTPs on preparing for Bosnia, please share them with the rest of the U.S. Army by contacting CALL at DSN 552-2255 or 3035, FAX DSN 552-9583, or commercial (913) 684-2255 or 3035. Our e-mail address is call@leavenworth.army.mil, and our web site is [<http://call.army.mil>](http://call.army.mil). Be sure to include your phone number and complete address when contacting CALL.

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Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned



After-Action Report (AAR) **SFOR7 – Citizen-Soldiers in Bosnia**

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NOTE: Special thanks to the command and staff of the 49th Armor Division who welcomed CALL at the AAR held at Camp Mabry, Austin, TX, from 17-26 January 2001. CALL acknowledges that the segments of this newsletter are the briefings provided by MG Halverson, BG Taylor, Dr. Finney, COL Kane, and LTC Hamilton during the AAR.

CALL has many products of interest to the Total Force. A partial listing may be found at the back of this publication. We invite you to visit our web site at:

<http://call.army.mil>

The intent of CALL publications is to share knowledge, support discussion and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner. This CALL publication is not a doctrinal product. The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) observed and reported in this publication are written by soldiers for soldiers. If you have, or your unit has, identified other relevant TTP for the U.S. Army, contact the Managing Editor at Coml (913) 684-3035/2255 or DSN 552-3035/2255; FAX DSN 552-3035/2255; e-mail: <segliel@leavenworth.army.mil>. Articles must be submitted in either Word Perfect or Word format. Graphs, slides and clipart must be submitted separately from the document in either ppt, pcx or wpg format.

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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Commander, U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1985, IAW AR 25-30.

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CHAPTER 1: STABILIZATION FORCE 7 (SFOR7) AN OVERVIEW BRIEF


“MISSION: Multi-national Division North (MND (N)) enforces military compliance IAW General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), maintains a *focused* military presence and supports the international community to ensure a safe and secure environment for the civil implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords.

SFOR 7’s mission in Bosnia was not unlike any of its predecessors. Initially, Bosnia had robust troop strength and a large military presence was easier to maintain. With lower troop strength, units must prioritize where presence should be high and where one can accept risk. Initially, soldier strength was 60,000 NATO and 20,000 U.S. By the time of SFOR 7, the U.S. strength had been reduced to 6,400. A portion of the 49th Armor Division (49th AD)’s task was to work through a process of how to cover the entire area of operations (AO) with a reduced military force structure. The *focused* military presence was a change. The 49th AD quickly decided where to locate forces and where to take risks.

The 49th AD and the 3^d Armored Cavalry Division (3^d ACR) deployed to Bosnia to support the international community and ensure a safe and secure environment. That part of the mission had not changed. SFOR 7 tried to push that peace process along a little bit further because of the compliant local national military forces. Those rotations created an environment that enabled them to focus on the international community more.

AC/RC Integration

In February of 1999, GEN Montgomery Meigs made the decision that the Regimental Headquarters 3^d ACR would not deploy. Seizing on this opportunity, the 49th AD built an integrated AC/RC headquarters. In most cases, a heavy division headquarters is 281 people, including cooks and mechanics. Initially, the headquarters requirement was 470 people. Non-doctrinal elements of the headquarters included the Joint Military Commission (JMC), Joint Visitor’s Bureau (JVB), which became very important, and a Mine Action Center. The 49th AD decided to roll primary staff officers of the regiment into this headquarters. The regiment commander became the deputy commander for operations in the U.S. Sector, the regimental XO became the assistant Chief of Staff (CofS), and the S1 became




the assistant G1. In conclusion, the unit consisted of 75-percent Reserve/Army National Guard and about 25-percent Active Duty.

How it worked

From the picture at the right taken in the Operation Center in Bosnia, you can see the various patches on the sleeves. We all worked together. If properly trained, and properly resourced, AC/RC integration works. Commanders have to “back off” of control. The regimental commander had to back off of control of the regimental staff officers that were put into the division.




The 49th AD used the Army doctrine training model. The unit began training general individual skills. Leader development, though, was more critical. The unit learned more about the Bosnian history and its culture through the use of a 13-book required reading list. The unit also conducted a Leader Training Program (LTP) at



Ft. Polk, LA, where they shadowed one of the Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs). The unit also took advantage of subject matter experts who could visit and provide short seminars on their various areas of expertise. When it came to individual readiness training and theatre-specific skills, the platoon and company situational training exercises were conducted at Fort Hood, TX, and Fort Carson, CO, with squadrons, companies/troops, and platoons executing those lanes using the 1st Cavalry Division (1st CD)’s examples.

Many have seen the road to the Bosnia slide. The 49th conducted six staff training exercises. During one of the first trips to Bosnia, pictures were taken of the battlefield update brief (BUB). When the 49th returned to Austin, they reconstructed the room using one of the existing buildings. The room was used during every staff-training event at Camp Mabry. The layout of the room was not new when the staff walked into the BUB in Eagle Base, Tuzla.



The unit used 108 days to train for the deployment. The unit was directed to conduct a seven-month rotation compared with the normal six-month rotation. The extra month was a result of the timing of the elections held in Bosnia, although the election was ultimately changed to a later date. The 49th AD changed the standard routine of “mobilize, train, and deploy,” to “train, mobilize, *and then* deploy.”

Employer Support of the Guard and Reserves (ESGR)

An important topic for discussion is employer support. This subject is always a concern. Army National Guard (ARNG) soldiers will return to civilian employment when they return from deployment. Soldiers were encouraged to inform their civilian supervisors that they would be mobilized and explain the purpose for deployment.

Some soldiers had a career while others had jobs. Many soldiers, who had a job, did not intend to return to the job. Therefore, it was important that their employers be informed. Those who had a career had to inform their supervisors early in the training cycle. Remember, soldiers with careers have *no protection under the law until the mobilization order is received*. A soldier’s livelihood may be at risk by informing employers too far in advance that they will be mobilized. Establishing good relationships with employers early and maintaining those relationships throughout the training and deployment are the key. Once a soldier informed the chain of command that his employer was

Speaking for the Soldiers
Employer support was very, very important to COMEAGLE during SFOR 7. Some regulations are being reworked at DOD level to make it less difficult to bring over ARNG employers. One of the employers, who visited TFE, Mr. Mark Brinkman, was asked by the Secretary of Defense to come to a Quality of Life summit in Washington. Since that time, Mr. Brinkman has been asked to speak to four regional Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve meetings and he hired five of the soldiers from SFOR 7. Further, COMEAGLE stated he does not apologize for taking employees away from employers for 7-9 months. He brings them back employees with new skills that no leadership seminar anywhere could teach.

notified, a personal letter was sent to the employer thanking them for his support. The letter also addressed the importance of what his employee was preparing to do. The 49th AD made an effort to stay in contact with employers throughout the deployment.

The 49th AD deployed 27 employers from nine different states (some of whom were also civic leaders) to Bosnia to actually visit the AO and view their employees/soldiers. It was difficult to deploy employers to Bosnia. There are no provisions in DOD regulations that stipulate provisions for the deployment of civilian employers. The 49th does conduct Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) events during annual training, referred to as “Boss Lifts” and used this as a precedent and worked through the requirements. Twenty-seven employers deployed with the Deputy Director of the National Guard Bureau and 34 members of the Division’s Band.



On the morning the group arrived, they boarded helicopters and viewed Srebrenica, Zvornikland, and other key areas in the AO. They saw the soldiers on the ground conducting their missions. The employers participated in a video teleconference (VTC) with the SACEUR. The 49th AD staff coordinated their attendance at the VTC. SACEUR agreed that the employers’ participation was an opportunity to express his appreciation for their support.

The tours continued around Eagle Base to allow the civilians to speak directly to soldiers on the job. Each soldier who had a visiting employer was given time to meet with his supervisor to explain his mission and the skills he was learning. At the end of the tour, the visitors attended a barbeque.

Individual Replacement Training (IRT)

Units from the 1st CD assisted the 49th AD train the IRT Trainers. The lanes were certified at both Ft. Hood and Ft. Carson. However, when the 1st CD concluded training of its brigade that deployed to Bosnia, their soldiers were reassigned to other U.S. Army units because of natural rotation schedules. There were no qualified personnel remaining to train other personnel.

The 49th AD trainers were the only personnel remaining. The division received the requirement to train 1,500 Active Duty soldiers at Ft. Hood, Ft. Sill, and Ft. Carson. The III Corps Commander treated members of the 49th AD as part of his corps.



The photo on the right is the BUB created in Austin, TX, not in Bosnia. It is important to emphasize and recognize that the 49th AD/SFOR 7 was a “Team of Teams.” Also key to remember here is that Guardsmen work regular jobs, Monday through Friday, and frequently take for granted that the fact they have military duty on the weekends. The Regimental soldiers had to keep up tough, real-world mission training, Monday through Friday, and then sacrifice their weekends to train in Austin. The commitment of the ACR soldiers included late Sunday afternoon departures and even later arrivals back at Ft. Carson.



The 49th had an advantage that prior SFORs did not. The team knew each other very well. A point that was stressed during the 49th AAR was that the team was going into the MRE together and they remained together throughout the mission. Staff coordination was included in the SOP, but, most importantly, the team had a strong foundation prior to the Bosnia deployment.



Advanced Decision-Making Exercise

The final training event before deployment was the Advanced Decision-Making Exercise (ADME). The ADME lasted for three days. Topics not discussed previously were addressed. The division had not had the opportunity to talk about the elections or covering the AO with a reduced force structure (during the MRE, the 49th received word that their force structure had been reduced by one squadron and an engineer battalion). The engineers were reassigned during the MRE to the security of Eagle Base.



Thirty days after the unit arrived in country, the elections were to take place. There had been many elections in Bosnia prior to the 49th's arrival; however, this election was to see much more involvement by the Bosniacs and the Serbians in election implementation.

Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE)

Visiting an MRE is very important for those who have the opportunity. It is a very realistic, tough, and stressful time. Similar to NTC, JRTC, or CMTC, there may not be too many days similar to the MRE days in country. The day of the elections and the Srebrenica commemoration were similar to the MRE. The MRE is likely the only opportunity rotations will




have with the entire team together prior to deployment. SFOR 7 did not have key elements, such as civil affairs and aviation assets, together, prior to their participation in the MRE. GEN (R) Crouch, along with CDR, III Corps, BCTP, and JRTC, built a scenario of events to test the Task Force and to continue learning. They departed very confident that the Team of Teams would be successful in Bosnia.

SFOR 7 Organization

Task Force Eagle (TFE) deployed into country with a total force of 6,800. The NORDPOL BG (Nordic Polish Battle Group) was truly international with staff from eight nations. The Division HQ, as well as the Russian Airborne Brigade and the Turkish Battalion, was not international. The Turkish BN TF and the Russian ABN BDE were in specific locations because of who they

were. They were in places where people of historically similar backgrounds lived. The Turks were with the Bosnians and the Russians were with the Serbians. Until July 2000, most of the soldiers in the Russian brigade were veterans of Chechnya. After the July rotation, many soldiers were new soldiers or soldiers who had prior service. Until SFOR 7, everyone downsized significantly; however,

the Russians reduced their force only slightly. The two ACR Squadrons from the 3^d ACR went to Camp McGovern and Camp Dobol along with the Support and Aviation Squadrons. TF Eagle integrated their AVN BDE HQ (57 soldiers) into an Aviation BDE Task Force.



COMEAGLE's Five Priorities

1. **Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees (DPRE) Return.**
2. **Women of Srebrenica visit Potocari.**
3. **Combined Projects.**
4. **Standards.**
5. **Safety.**

Although they turned out to be the most significant events, the list above was really a Mission-Essential Tasks List (METL). Using Army doctrine, TFE sorted its way through many sets of instructions from many sources to create the way that COMEAGLE wanted to focus the efforts of the unit. The top three came from the staff's mission analysis. The analysis and design could only occur after arrival in the country. Upon developing the synchronization, TFE was able to focus its efforts on key actions. These five priorities remain constant throughout the deployment. The focus may have changed based on the CG's guidance (i.e., during the first 30 days, election implementation was key, then it changed to DPRE returns, then to women of Srebrenica, the transfer of authority). It takes a great deal of intellectual energy to become confident in choosing the correct focus in a peace support operation because of the myriad of important needs. Choosing and maintaining the focus is key to the success of follow-on units.

The compliance of the Former Warring Factions (FWFs) with the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) allowed the task force to focus on DPRE operations.



DPRE operations caused the most pressure on a day-to-day basis. International organizations and the U.S. Ambassador assigned tasks that did not necessarily fit into what TFE was doing militarily. Future rotations need to be able to adjust to this environment. The U.S. Ambassador may call and announce he will visit towns in your AO and invite you to accompany him. Future rotations need to be aware and accept these situations and provide support as requested.



Understanding *property legislation* in this area is very important. If an American goes away for a few weeks and returns to find someone living in his house, he would tell them to leave or call the police. That is not what happens in Bosnia. This is a difficult concept to understand if you do not live in the region. It is important that new rotations

understand the rules that are set by the international community and the Office of the High Representative to the United Nations.

Embracing the international community and local officials during DPRE operations was the key to success. The CG, SFOR 7, believed that in many cases, there had been frequent disputes and limited cooperation. The CG was determined to enhance cooperation during his rotation. It did not matter that TFE did not agree with what the officials were going to do or how they wanted to do it. TFE was there to support. This required reaching out and endorsing them. This technique was so effective that when TFE made suggestions, more often than not, they were accepted. When the Women of Srebrenica Operation was to take place, TFE conducted two rehearsals or “rock drills.” The international community was invited to participate in the second iteration. When the rock drill began, there was some reluctance among the international community attendees, but TFE continued to work through the event. Soon it became clear to those participating how events would progress and there was no further discussion on how the event was to occur. TFE was logical in their approach and this technique provided for the support of the international community representatives and local officials.

When TFE experienced a success, such as moving the first five families back into a community within two kilometers of Zvornik (Za vor nick), it was a significant event. Zvornik was the heart of the Serbian area. TFE wanted to build on the success of that event to maintain momentum. They sought the international community to sponsor another 25 movements.

Planning for what would become known as *The Women of Srebrenica*, the mission began early. TFE accepted that SFOR HQ in Sarajevo seldom provided clear and timely guidance and capitalized on that fact.



The fifth anniversary of the fall of Srebrenica and the atrocities that occurred around Potocari happened on 11 July 2000. TFE knew many women survivors would want to participate in the events surrounding this anniversary. Initial reports stated there would be approximately 100 buses and 5,000 people. However, only 61 buses and the appropriate number of women were scheduled. The physical layout of Potocari could not hold 100 busses and all the people. Maintenance problems prevented six busloads of women from making it to Potocari; however, there were no incidents during the activities. The success of this operation was due to the good working relationships established with the international community, local officials, and local police.




Even while embracing these communities and organizations, the police do not necessarily develop security plans for them. In fact, the local police would have been very grateful if TFE would have written their security plan. Then, had an incident occurred, it would have been TFE/SFOR/U.S.’s plan and the local police could not be held accountable. Follow-on rotations should establish good working relationships and *review* the plans.

The Joint Military Commission (JMC) had many successes. Weapons storage sites (WSSs) were reduced from 124 to 96. TFE eliminated many that were unsafe and consolidated many others. The closing and consolidating of the WSS reduced the very time-consuming inspections that were required. Those inspections, although time-consuming, resulted in the knowledge that the weapons were still in the site and that the disposition of Air Defense assets is always important.

The JMC also reduced the number of ranges from 61 to 38. This reduction was significant since many of these ranges were on lands that belonged to people who wanted to return home. When the military agreed to close a range or the area surrounding a range, the long process of returns could begin.


The JMC, along with the Engineers, was very successful in completing many of the joint projects. There were not sufficient engineers to build bridges (indicated on the slide above); however, working together as a multinational team, TFE was able to accomplish many of these bridge projects.



The Celic (Chel-itch) Bridge was the first bridge constructed by the TFE. It was a Bailey bridge project. The Canton governor paid for the materials, the Entity Armed Forces (EAF or FWF) provided the manpower, and the U.S. Engineers provided the technical advice. Four bridges were constructed using the same methods.

Standards

COMEAGLE placed the NCOs in charge of standards. The CSM published a ***Standards Handbook*** that both the CG and CSM endorsed. Expectations for every soldier were included. The ***Standards Handbook*** was distributed to everyone in TFE. The NCOs (Active and Reserve Component) enforced the standards specified in the handbook.




Soldiers looked good and carried themselves with pride. They knew their mission. Because of the efforts of the NCOs, soldiers were also cognizant of safety and no one wanted to be the first to accidentally fire his weapon.

Safety was a topic discussed at every meeting. Patrol leader's troop-leading procedures (TLPs) were used to standard (FM 7-8, FM 17-98, FKSM-17-98-3).

There were only 21 Class B and Class C accidents. Only three of the accidents involved vehicles. Fifteen were personal injuries caused by athletic events such as tag football and soccer. One accident was a fire. There were also two aviation accidents. Most importantly, there were no accidental discharges of any weapons by any U.S. Army soldiers during the 49th AD tenure in country. There

were three during SFOR 7 with two at Eagle Base and one at Dobol. Nearly 2,000 safety awards were presented during SFOR 7. This was because of NCO commitment to ensuring the jobs were done to the standard.



Operations Role-up

TFE conducted nearly 17,000 daytime "presence patrols" and approximately 3,000 at night. The Aviation brigade was able to conduct more than 1,600 missions dedicated to reconnaissance and approximately 700 general-support missions.

There were more areas demined during SFOR 7 than other rotations. This was because of the Engineer analysis of previous demining events. They changed from paying contractors by the hour/day to the area covered.



Plans, Planning Guidance, and the Planning Orchestration

Early on in the train-up, the unit became decisively involved in the MDMP and how it operates. The process came together during the 49th's training when the CG became aware of how much more involvement was required on his part. He became aware of how important he was to MDMP during a briefing as part of one of the six staff training events. A mission was issued to the staff and the CG gave the staff some initial guidance. As normal, the staff left to prepare the mission analysis and the resulting brief was far short of what he expected.

The CG knew instinctively that this staff was better than what it had presented. Feeling that he had not given them the right guidance or good guidance, he assembled the ADC-S, CofS, G3, and some other key staff for an officer professional development (OPD) with assistance from 5th Army Trainers. The program of instruction (POI) was on MDMP, but the focus was on the commander's role, including when and how the commander should become involved.

FM 101-5, Operations, provides specific items in the commander's guidance including content and parameters. The list shows items that explain combat operations. The list is specific. However, for Peace Support or Stability and Support Operations (SASO), the list is less specific. As an example, where does fire support fall in SASO? The CG and staff learned that it translates to information operations. The result of the OPD session was very rewarding. The CG wrote out guidance on each and every point and it was typed up and distributed to all of the staff. That was the "breakthrough" to get his plans group to understand what the CG wanted. This was carried on into Bosnia.

In Bosnia, the plans group had a separate building with furniture, space, computer support, and a briefing area. One of the most significant points for future CGs is that they must stay engaged with the plans group. In the staff battle rhythm, every Saturday morning there was a CCIR update from the plans group. There are approximately 12 contingency plans on top of all the operational plans for SFOR rotations. There will be times that it will be very beneficial for the CG or the ADC to read the plans in detail.

On Thursday afternoons, the Chief of Plans would provide the CG with a blue notebook. The notebook had a cover memo that stated the upcoming brief and requested what guidance was required for the brief. This gave the CG the opportunity to prepare for the meeting, add items to the brief, or simply write out the guidance. Many times, the CG would cancel the plans update briefing for some of the staff. One of the items the CG learned was that during briefings the staff sometimes misunderstood guidance from a long discussion. One of the best methods to ensure there was no confusion was to meet with some of the key planners to articulate what his vision was for an event.

The following are transcripts from GEN (R) Crouch, MG Halverson, COMEAGLE SFOR 7, and COL Patterson, CofS, in reference to the planning process.

GEN (R) Crouch

“The reason this area is getting so much attention here is this is a very difficult action to take – providing guidance and getting staff to incorporate outcomes into plans. The manuals are not very well written in regards to Stability and Support Operations (SASO) MDMP at this point. In many cases, it is difficult to work through what is meant due to its conventional orientation.

What is required, through this process, is to gain the initiative. Normal peace support operations are reactive. A planning process that is fairly aggressive creates a mindset that puts the target on his back feet. It allows for analysis of many possibilities, based on the METL, and postulate where you want to go and what will be the end state. It must be a very organized and disciplined process. MDMP gives you a format to do that. Each commander uses it a little differently depending on position such as a CG, ACR SQN commander, or Army Group commander. The outcome is a thought process that allows the unit to take either a mission given from someone else or a perceived mission and allows you to work your way through it.

If the mission is similar to the Women of Srebrenica operation and the unit has a goal that is way out and there is ample planning time, it is easier but often provides too much time to second-guess actions during planning sessions. By using the processes, units will have a better chance through a focused analytical capability of accomplishing what they intend. A key to this occurring is the commander’s intent. This process allows you a disciplined process, one that all staffs are familiar with in order to maintain the initiative in an uncertain situation. Bosnia is uncertain.

A recent example where this process was used is from the USS Cole Commission. The SECDEF gave a charter with an admiral and a general as leaders, neither one of which spoke the same language. They took the charter, the verbal guidance given by the SECDEF, their notes, and those two wrote a mission statement, CDR’s intent statement (not normal for the Navy), a desired end state, a METL, and a milestones schedule to accomplish the investigation. Then they handed it to a joint staff. It worked! This process works, particularly when you don’t know quite what to do. It gives the commander and his organization the initiative to get in front of those who would have your mission fail.”

MG Halverson

“In Bosnia, there are about 12 contingency plans. The Plans Group must constantly update them. Those plans provide for actions to gain and maintain the initiative under a particular set of circumstances. These contingency plans deal with a variety of topics that the task force may be faced with. Most importantly for future commanders is that they must maintain contact with the planners and be available to them.

Many times when the planners were working an action and they had a question, all they had to do was contact my aide to find time in the calendar for them to come to the office or vice versa. I never took more than a few hours to respond back to the Plans Group for a question. I always assumed that if the Plans Group was at a point where they needed guidance, they were at a point where they could not continue without an answer.

The Strategic Planner was normally focused on a different area other than what the Plans Group was working on. I kept these two groups separate and worked with them separately."

GEN (R) Crouch

"Abnormally in this division, there is a Strategic Planning Group, normally run by a Colonel. In this operation, the Colonel is focused on assessments and long-term force structure items. The Strategic plans office has a TDA augmentation (four personnel) that is not part of the Task Force Headquarters. That organization is also linked with SFOR directly and does a lot of direct liaison work with SFOR looking at long-term items. The planning items are focused on the METL of TFE. The CG, CofS, and G3 need to sort their way through how not to impede the planning process but reinforce it and deal with it as the time comes."

COL Garry Patterson, CofS

"In the plans operations, the intellectual agility that is required is very significant. Sometimes, TFE changed its battle rhythm every Tuesday and Thursday. After conference calls in the morning, the CofS spent at least an hour with the plans group. On Thursdays, after meeting with the planners, the CofS had the opportunity to brief the CG on issues that would arise during the Saturday planning session. The key point here is that there was not much time to delay actions and plans. Most often in the past, the Division's Warfighter preparation had the luxury of a long train-up. In Bosnia and Peace Support Operations, that does not exist. During SFOR 7, TFE completed 26 OPLANs in seven months. At any one time, the plans staff would be working at various stages on as many as seven plans simultaneously. Frequently, for a mission analysis brief or a course-of-action brief, the ADC would be the only one available to receive it. Sometimes, the CofS would be the only one available to take the initial brief. The Plans Group needs to be segmented to prioritize what is most successful. The CofS tried to keep his finger on the process; the G3 provided the over-watch but was most focused on future operations (FOPS) and current operations. The Strategic Planners were looking long-range assessments and force structure changes.

FOPS guys were separated from the Plans Group. FOPS worked directly for the G3. Handing off plans was key to determining what was significant. The G3 was responsible for putting plans into an Implementation Plan (IMPIN) (used for all forces due to the international forces who could not be given operations orders due to political reasons). TFE had a long-term execution matrix for plans that included the stages of their implementation and responsible parties. This ensured visibility of all operations and where they were in their evolution."

GEN (R) Crouch

"Traditionally, most divisions have trouble with this in the planning process. You have a strategic planning operation totally separate and focused in specific areas. Next, you have the plans group, which the previous paragraphs discussed. Then you have FOPS. FOPS publish the FRAGOs or IMPINs that are to be published in the next 96 hours (a day to day 7). FOPS take the immediate stuff and turn it into a FRAGO to the things you have to react to. Finally, you have current operations that turn it into "Fox Mike" direct actions to the fighters. There are four different "orchestrators" of the division's combat power that all have different relationships, all

must communicate with each other, and one can very quickly upset the remainder of the planners. Coordinating all the planners is a tremendous job for a G3 or CofS. However, one other key player in there is the Chief of Operations. The Chief of Operations ensured all movement of plans through their stages and is legion to success.”

Planning and Guidance Final Comments, COMEAGLE, SFOR 7


“MDMP has been discussed as the “American Express Card” of a successful rotation. Don’t leave home without it. It does work, but you must work at it to ensure success. Peace support operations are extremely complex. They require the CG/Commander to ensure they give the right guidance that commanders need. We have all sat through briefings where commanders did not give any guidance or little and staffs depart and waste much time. In Bosnia, there is no time to waste. As COMEAGLE, I felt it was my duty to ensure I gave the staff the guidance they needed to ensure 1) they accomplish my intent, and 2) they do not waste time. In Bosnia, you and your staffs will be working 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and you will still feel that you don’t have enough time. Maximize, organize, provide guidance, and ensure your plans process is smooth and working. Task-organize your staff to ensure it is the main effort and you will reap many benefits.”

Top 10 Lessons:

- **The Army training model works so use it.**
- **An ESGR program must be developed and exercised throughout the deployment.** It needs commander support at all levels.
- **Build and get certified you own IRT.** It will earn dividends down the line.
- **Identify the deploying staff early.** Keep it together throughout the train-up.
- **The MRE and ADME are not just other steps toward deployment.** They are your validation exercises that allow you to deploy. Threat them as a goal.
- **Choosing and maintaining focus is a key to success.**
- **Local laws and customs, such as those pertaining to property legislation, need to be fully understood and adjusted to.** They frame the basis for behavior by the local national.
- **Embrace the international community and local officials in all that you do.** A key to success for DPRE operations was oversight and advising. Do not become so involve that you write the plan for them. Because if the execution of the plan you wrote fails, they will blame you for a faulty plan.
- **Enforcing standards is an NCO duty.**
- **The commander is important in the MDMP and, therefore, should stay involved.** The MDMP is not staff-centric; both the commander and the staff share centrality in the MDMP.

CHAPTER 2: TRAINING FOR THE MISSION

The Army has a training model and it works. The way the 49th Armored Division (49th AD) viewed this model from a Reserve Component (RC) perspective and determined that their normal inactive duty training (IDT) should be used for “getting ready to get ready.” As they were conducting their normal training throughout the year, they were getting ready to conduct mobilization (get ready). The old model is: mobilize, train, and deploy. Given the time restraints and issues that the 49th AD faced, the model was changed to: train, mobilize, and deploy. In this particular situation, the 49th AD had almost no post mobilization training time. So most of their training certification was conducted in a premobilization status.



Future rotations will learn that the most important part of the training for the mission occurs before the unit gets the mission. Some of the important events that led to the success of the training program conducted by the 49th were the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) and the Battle Command Battle Staff Training (BCBST) events immensely.

The mission of the MND (N) is a classic cavalry reconnaissance and security mission. The 49th AD believes that the unit was very fortunate to have the 3^d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) with them for their rotation. In fact, two thirds of the U.S. force was made up of the 3^d ACR. The time and division of labor between the National Guard and active duty units differs. Most of the traditional guardsmen have what are termed “day jobs.” The regimental staff put in more time than many traditional guardsmen. Unlike the current six-month rotation, this one lasted seven months. The right-seat-ride program took another two to three weeks and that put the average 49th AD soldier in country for approximately seven and one-half months. The 270-day mobilization and the seven and one-half months plus the period planned for using all leave that was accrued at the end of the mobilization simply did not provide enough time to train after mobilization.

Another issue that will come out very quickly to future rotations is that the Reserve Component (RC) and the Active Component (AC) train at different velocities. For example, the 49th AD had a 12-month window to arrive at the mission rehearsal exercise (MRE). The AC units had a four-month window.

The 49th's rapport with III Corps and its proximity to Ft. Hood, TX, allowed the division to establish secure electronic connectivity with Bosnia very quickly. The 49th AD was allowed to listen to the video teleconferences (VTCs) that were taking place between III Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division (1st CD). In fact, when the 10th Mountain Division (10th MTN) assumed the

MND (N) mission, the 49th AD was allowed to sit in on their VTCs as well. These teleconferences allowed the command and staff to get a continuous supply of information and gain situational awareness and maintain it throughout the training. In fact, during the training, the staff could see why something that was briefed to the Corps commander was significant and, therefore, they better understood the situation.

Signal support for the train-up, whether that is at the MRE or in country, is a very important function. The soldiers that work in the G6 shop need to be extremely well trained in this area. The G-6 will be maintaining not only telephone lines, FM radios, secure FM, and other types of traditional communications means, but they will also be responsible for VTCs, the MND (N) website, e-mail accounts, the monitoring of e-mail accounts, and for maintaining secure communications.

With few exceptions, most future rotations will be doing something very similar to the model shown below. But one very essential element, the “eyes on the target” is not included on this model. In November 1998, when the 49th AD first received the mission, MG Byrnes, the CG of the 1st CD, offered 10 seats on an aircraft that went to Bosnia. This allowed the division to put eyes on the target very early on. This is important because until you have been to Bosnia and seen it, felt it, touched it, and experienced it, you really do not know what it is. Early and continuous reconnaissance is important to this mission. You will be better served to reconnoiter this part of the world several times for a short period rather than one trip for several weeks. The theater is constantly evolving and there are many changes that can be seen and experienced with many short trips. This theater will change subtlety and the changes may not be noticed. Try to phase your people in and out many times to help assist in the area of responsibility (AOR). This also helps with situational awareness.

The experience soldiers and leaders collect from the trips is invaluable. For example, the CG of the 49th AD went to Bosnia for three weeks and visited with MG Byrnes. He arrived approximately two hours prior to the Kosovo bombing campaign. He was able to see what happens when our forces in-country get into a very contentious operation. When he returned to the states, the rest of the 49th AD was undergoing a staff-training vignette at the 49th AD Battle Update Briefing (BUB). In less than 48 hours, the CG was able to give us his account of his experiences on the trip. The trips enabled the division to stay near real time on all of the issues that are discussed not only by being there, but also by staying connected electronically.

The long deployment prevented the division from using many post-mobilization training days before deploying. Recognizing this up-front, the unit developed a training concept, which used several weekend staff exercises and multiple reconnaissance missions to Bosnia. This concept resulted in 108 total training days during the year before the unit deployed which is more than double the normal OPTEMPO for the division's traditional guardsmen. Although future deployments are limited to six months and allow for some post mobilization training, there is still a significant



problem conducting collective training post mobilization because of the time required to ship critical equipment into country. One of the first events on this chart is a leader's reconnaissance. This was accomplished along with the 2^d Brigade, 1st CD. This was the first time the 49th AD key staff got to take a look at Bosnia. The 2^d BDE also was conducting their mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) at Fort Polk. They were gracious enough to allow more of the 49th's troops to embed themselves with their staff during the 2^d's MRE. The teaming aspect of getting RC soldiers to train next to AC soldiers is very important. It ensures RC staffs are ready and able to conduct the MDMP process and develop a refined plan for their own MRE, which was conducted later that year. It also gave the AC staffs a better understanding of the RC staff status and what remains to be accomplished.

In March and April, the division conducted the first staff exercises. When one considers the "crawl-walk-run" method of conducting operations, the division was definitely at the crawl stage. This was the "build-the-team" time for SFOR 7. The 49th AD had to be introduced to many subordinate units for the first time and learn what they knew and answer their questions.

The 49th AD was able to coordinate with 1st CD and later 10th MTN to set up training vignettes based on near real-time scenarios emanating from Bosnia. TRW, a government contractor, supported the division by using the training to directly influence the division's exercises. The 49th was also able to schedule VTCs with their counterparts in country. Therefore, the chaplains, the doctors and all of the other staff sections could communicate regularly. The division tried to keep focused on the steady-state operations or the daily missions. Although this may seem routine and mundane, it is not. Maintaining and understanding the steady state is a major mission in itself.

RC units have an advantage with respect to training events. Because of the time between drills, RC units can have a training event one month followed by a certain amount of rest. This allows the RC unit members to reflect and assess the training. Although it was unfortunate that RC soldiers did not train daily with AC units, there was some value to the way the RC units conducted training.

The Leader Training Program (LTP) was the first time the 49th AD was able to assemble all of the operations and plans personnel from both the division and the 3^d ACR together for one training exercise. In some respects, this was a type of a mini-MRE for the division. The staffs were also able to plan out a few months and look for other events that the 1st CD or the 10th MTN were working on that the 49th could use. The LTP conducted at Ft Polk is usually oriented toward the brigade or battalion staff so personnel had to change their program slightly to accommodate the division's staff. This was another great opportunity for the 49th to learn from the subject matter experts in the 10th MTN DIV. This was also the second MRE for the division to observe before undergoing its own in November. This time allowed the 49th some additional refining of the division's plan for the upcoming MRE.

The 49th AD's training year (TY) 99 annual training (AT) was conducted in two increments. Before the AT, a briefing room was built similar to the one in Bosnia called the "BUB" (after the battle update briefing room or fest tent that is in Bosnia). The first increment of the AT was a seven-day exercise where the staff worked in the BUB continuously. This was the first time the unit was able to work with all of its operations and planning cells together. The staff worked steady state (routine) operations and other taskings required by the trainers. The second increment of AT was conducted at the individual readiness training (IRT) at Fort Hood. Once the 49th had its own IRT trainers certified, it trained the rest of the division's soldiers that could not make AT. The team trained approximately twice as many active duty soldiers. The team became a III Corps asset. They trained a large group of soldiers bound for Kosovo on short notice and this made them even better trainers for our folks.

The Peace Support Operations Seminar in July 1999 provided the 49th AD the opportunity to observe how the staff operates in higher-level operations. Differing scenarios forced the division to deal with the international community (IC). Several subject matter experts were brought in by BCTP for this exercise. The unit learned a valuable lesson -- IC personnel do what they want and not necessarily what the Army requires. They are less focused, organized and responsive than Army staffs would desire, but this is just part of the test in deploying to Bosnia. The more you learn about the IC, the better off you will be. Remember, except for the military aspects of Dayton (Peace Accords), we are in the Balkans "in support of" the Bosnian people. Part of the determination of follow-on units' success will be defined by how well they energize the IC and the local police and work with them.

The 49th AD then used the next three months to assess its training state. The division began to focus on what was needed to be successful at the next major training event, the MRE. The time was also used to build depth into the team. The division assessed it would lose several personnel; therefore, it wanted to have a reserve of trained staff members.

The next major training event was the MRE. Signal support for this was absolutely critical. The 49th's signal team deployed to Ft. Polk three weeks early to set up and test all of the communications for this exercise. Part of this decision was made based on the assessment that the signal team did not have enough hands-on training with equipment. The signal team deployed early to have uninterrupted time to train. The actual time needed for the MRE was about one week. It also deployed the fabricated BUB to Ft. Polk. When the division redeployed, the BUB was left behind for follow-on unit use.

In January, the 49th AD underwent an advance decision-making exercise (ADME) at home station. BCTP presented three scenarios and the staff took the issues and conducted the MDMP. There were many IOs and PVOs present as well as United Nations representation. Having an ADME right after the MRE was probably advantageous. In fact, it was during the conduct of the MRE that the CG, 49th AD, decided what issues still needed to be worked.

The following is a compilation of transcriptions from GEN (R) Crouch, MG Halverson (CG, 49th AD, and BG Taylor (ADC-S).

GEN (R) Crouch: *“JRTC and BCTP put together an MRE that is generally focused on the lessons learned from the past and any clairvoyance they have from constant rotations going in and out of various people looking at what is currently going on from VTCs and input from the current SFOR. That MRE was crafted to be as broad as we could make it within the parameters that I just described. But it is a stressful exercise for both the troops, going through their various lanes, and for the division headquarters, as we try and keep both of those hooked together. And it is a 24-hour exercise.*

There are adjustments made during the MRE. In other words, if we encounter something the unit is not doing very well, and this is pure training, the idea is to achieve the standard. So if we are having trouble in a particular area, we will daily assess where that is. The CG and I will talk about it in some depth. Then we will come back and we will re-craft another event. How that occurs or is stimulated as when a platoon runs into something or from SFOR giving you instructions really depends on the task itself. But we will do that until we are a P+. There is no going though the motions or we want to familiarize you with this. If we are going to do it, we are going to master the task. And so we will keep training on that thing and driving it and driving it until we get there. That gets frustrating, but we will make sure we get certified in the basic tasks for the Army before the Corps Commander is satisfied that the unit is ready to go.



The ADME is a different kind of event. It really relates back to the initial decision-making exercise to a certain extent, but there is a lot of concentration there on MDMP and cultural and organizational processes that we go through. When we go through the ADME, we are conducting a “spring board” just before leaving as close to that as we can make it to ensure that we have intellectually examined those things that we believe based upon the incumbent Division’s best judgment of the first major task that you are going to have or tasks, like an election or a major displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees (DPRE) return. So we will not make that decision on how to craft the ADME until you are in the MRE. This will cause a lot of late nights for many folks between the two exercises trying to make sure we have them both properly crafted. In one case, we had a unit that had a real problem during the MRE with a particular task. We could not fix it. So what we had to do was to say we are OK Corps Commander to be certified, minus this particular task, and so we created a vignette to work our way through it during the ADME to gain certification in all areas that were determined important for the unit. So this is an additional benefit for the ADME after the MRE. So be sensitive to the fact that this exercise is a time to work through some thought processes to create a plan not to work people around the clock.”

MG Halverson: *"We did not work everybody at the ADME. We only had 68 people participate. Not the entire team. It was an intellectual exercise to determine how we were going to work through those issues of election support and restructuring. Our fear was that we were going to fall in on someone else's plan that we were not familiar with. As it turned out, the 10th MTN planners that fell in with us had all of the local information and the plan that we left here with was the plan that we fell in on. It was that well coordinated. We even launched our elections planners to Bosnia just a few weeks later to embed themselves with the 10th MTN staff."*

BG Taylor: *"This restructuring of the SFOR issue was not just a U.S. issue. We discussed this issue during the MRE after we received official word that MND (N) force structure was to be reduced. The Multinational partners were doing the same thing and this downsizing continues today. So the troop-to-task ratio is constantly changing and the problem is you have the same amount of dirt but less troops to do the job. And boundaries changed during this restructuring so you have to look across the whole AOR and see what changes are being made."*

Then we reached our mobilization date of 7 March and deployed our folks and started the right-seat-ride program. One proof of our plan was that we had very little that had to be accomplished just before we left due to the training throughout the year. So the troops did not have to do much just prior to leaving. We gave all of them a full day off before flying out. This helped us, since when we got over there, we had twice as many troops in one place with our troops bringing U.S. bugs to them and their troops giving Bosnian bugs to us. With well-rested troops, we were able to get over that fairly quickly."


The right-seat-ride program works very well. Send your troops over there and just do it. The program is run by the outgoing command. They will show your troops around every day for two weeks and when they are done, your staff, down to the private, will know what they need to be comfortable and get the job done. Being electronically linked and having reconnoitered the area many times, it was less intimidating. For some, it only takes about one week before you get the idea that the old guy should hurry up and leave."




TRAIN-UP SUSTAIN

REPLICATE STAFF PROCESSES AND RELATIONSHIPS

- Replicate staff interaction and proximity
- Not necessary to build a new facility
- Primary staff personal relationships (G10)




There is an old saying that goes: "What is rehearsed many times is what you will do well." Try to replicate as best as possible those processes that you will face, and then practice them many times. The physical layout is not as important as the processes that you will fall in on. One tactic, technique or procedure (TTP) that the 49th AD found is what it called the G10 meeting. This is the G2, G3, and the G5 as a planning team that met on issues pertaining to the overall plan. This can be operations, current operations or strategic, civil affairs, and most other areas. These sections are extremely important."




TRAIN-UP SUSTAIN

MDMP and the Plans Process




- Stabilize the Planning team early
- Develop TTPs and Tools to facilitate the process
- Command group get comfortable with the Planners




It was deemed important to stabilize the planning team as early as possible. This is one area where the RC may have an advantage. The 49th was able to determine who was required and receive commitments from those personnel that they would be able to deploy for the duration. Then the division secured the necessary Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) funding for these people to participate for special periods at special events. This ensured the division had the right people working full time in support of this deployment.

Geographical dispersion kept the 49th AD from training with the 3^d ACR's squadrons until the MRE. This was unfortunate, but this is what happens with RC units doing this type of operation. The next few National Guard Divisions may have this problem exaggerated based on having many units in different states coupled with an AC unit assigned to them. In the AC's eyes, they are still maintaining a war-fighting stance until about four months out. Therefore, their focus is a little different. Although the 3^d ACR had commanders coming down and giving a briefing and getting into the planning, the first time we got together with all of our equipment on the ground was at the MRE.



TRAIN-UP IMPROVE




Incorporate Subordinate CPs into Staffexs Early


- We did not interact with the Task Forces until the MRE.
- Ensure that operational reports are standard throughout the command.
- Standardize operational terms

Lessons Learned

During the MRE, the 49th AD found that standardizing our reports is as important as report discipline. In Bosnia, the rule is the first report is always wrong, so verify. The second report probably is too, so keep verifying. That is how the division stopped a tanker truck at the border with suspected gasoline for the Serbs in Yugoslavia and discovered it was really hauling plum brandy. In the same vein, it is important to use the same operational terms. You need to go back to Army 101 and do not allow "Texasisms" or "Cavalryisms" to creep into your SOP (a reference to the 49th AD being from Texas and the 3^d ACR's Cavalry terms). The MND (N) area is made up of many different type units from all over the world. Use Army doctrinally correct terms when conducting operations; therefore, everyone knows what you are talking about.



TRAIN-UP IMPROVE



Replicate Various Communications Networks

- If possible train with multiple phone systems each with different classifications.
- Utilize at least three different computer networks with different classifications.
- Get used to Operational Security Awareness

Lessons Learned

Train up your communications folks early and maintain your connectivity with Bosnia. Train with many telephone systems and ensure that they have multiple classifications. This will be important when you get in country. You will also have to deal with multiple computer networks, each of which will have different classifications as well. You will find yourself working operations security (OPSEC) awareness issues much of the time. This is one area you will have to stay up on the whole time you are deployed. It became common for us to believe that what we were producing that day was about to get into someone else's hands that night. With that in mind you have to keep asking yourself what will they do with the information and what will they learn."

GEN (R) Crouch: *"I am not sure you are going to get much improvement in this at the MRE. It is a very expensive problem to solve. There is a tremendous investment of millions of dollars that has gone into Bosnia to fix this and I do not think that the Army will try to fix this at Ft. Polk at the MRE. The fact is, however, that OPSEC is a reality and we must condition ourselves to try and remember the lessons learned here."*

BG Taylor: *"It is interesting how the Army specifically, and the military in general, can leverage the AC/RC integration to educate our hometown America. This is a really good thing. I live in a small town of about 35,000 people. My father was born and raised there, as was I. Once the local newspaper got the story, they conducted an interview of their "hometown boy" deploying to Bosnia. I conducted about 20 local and civic organization talks before deploying. I am now talking with those same organizations now that I am back. It is amazing the amount of interest people take in having a local person do an operation like this. These are great opportunities for us to conduct educational awareness and I encourage all RC soldiers to take advantage of this opportunity. This is not propaganda. This is information operations. You can leverage this for your unit, what you do, or for the Army. Most people in America do not have a clue as to what is happening in the Balkans. And this is fine since they do not know anybody over there so this operation is not on their radarscope. The 3^d ACR conducted a world-class operation bringing civic leaders from around the Ft Carson area over to Bosnia to see what the soldiers are doing. We will miss an opportunity if we do not use this to tell the Army story. Those employers left with tears in their eyes. They had no idea what our soldiers risk every day over there. You need to take a few minutes to develop a 10-minute canned slide presentation or video that you can use to seed your community with. You will be amazed at the amount of support you are going to get."*

There are a number of slides that were not briefed in their entirety by the 49th AD staff but contain lessons learned in the training area. Time constraints prevented the ADC from giving his entire presentation. The complete presentation is included as Appendix A to this newsletter. These slides include comments from all of the division staff sections, subordinate units, and various headquarters. They are divided by the phases of this operation. The phases are:

- **Train-up.**
- **Mobilization/Deployment.**
- **Mission Execution (by section).**
- **Mission Execution (by BOS).**
- **Redeployment/Demobilization.**

Top 10 Lessons:

- **RC units must change training philosophy from mobilize, train, and then deploy to *train, mobilize, and deploy*.**
- **Training velocities differ between the AC and RC.** When developing your training strategy, take the differences into consideration.
- **Signal support is very important in Bosnia.** The soldiers assigned to the G6 shop must be proficient in their duties.
- **During the preparation phase for mission to Bosnia, visit often for short periods of time, if at all possible.** This allows unit leadership to understand the situation and notice changes.
- **Whenever possible, audit the VTCs of the current unit in Bosnia.** Auditing allows leaders and the staff to get their heads in the game.
- **Leaders and the staff must understand the motivations and capabilities of international community organizations.**
- **Create depth in your staff during preparation for the mission.** This way, the loss of one soldier is easier to overcome.
- **The right-seat-ride program works well.** Get the most out of it.
- **Replicate, as best as possible, the processes that you will face them; do these processes over and over again during your pre-mobilization training.**
- **The first report is always wrong, so verify.**

CHAPTER 3:

SFORs MND (N) BOSNIA/HERZEGOVINA:

A POLAD’S PERSPECTIVE

“No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of political factors...”
-- Carl Von Clausewitz

Who Is a POLAD?

POLAD stands for Political Advisor. The person is a state department, senior foreign service officer with general officer rank equivalency with ample experience with the policy process. POLADs are skilled political, economic, and security analysts with regional and/or functional expertise and language fluency. The POLAD detailed to SFORs in MND (N) in Tuzla, Bosnia, and Herzegovina serves as the personal advisor to the commanding general (CG) and is a member of the command group (CMD GRP). It is important to note that the CG makes the final decision on the selection of his POLAD. He rates the POLAD on his annual fitness report. The POLAD belongs to the CG. His loyalty, first and foremost, is to the CG and to the CMD GRP.

The state department normally details POLADs only at the senior U. S. senior military commanders at the four-star level. Currently, there are 16 POLADs detailed to top U. S. military leaders and commanders in the United States and around the globe. These include the four military service chiefs in the pentagon, the five regional CINCs (commanders in chief), three functional commands (SOCOM, SPACECOM, and STRATCOM) and three subordinate commanders in Europe. Because of the special requirements of peacekeeping operations, a POLAD is detailed to the two-star division commander at the MND (N) in Tuzla, Bosnia/Herzegovina.

Key POLAD Tasks

The POLAD’s core function at MND (N) is to provide expert policy support and political advice to the CG and the CMD GRP. To carry out his responsibility successfully, it is vital that the POLAD be fully integrated into the CMD GRP. This enables the POLAD to cross the full spectrum of MND (N)’s organization and operations and exchange information and assessments regularly with the division senior leadership. It also permits the POLAD to develop solid working relationships and personal ties with the division’s top officers and NCOs that are essential for good teamwork. At MND (N), the POLAD and the CMD GRP not only work closely together as an integrated team on a daily basis but also share a common living and eating space. This helps promote further solidarity and comradeship among the CMD GRP, especially in an environment where the division is operating on a 24-hour, seven-day-a-week schedule such as MND (N).

It is important to ensure that the POLAD detailed to the CG of MND (N) participates in the mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) and the advance mission rehearsal exercise (ADME) of the U.S. headquarters unit in the United States before it deploys to Bosnia and Herzegovina. This greatly facilitates the POLAD's introduction to the CG and to the CMD GRP and lays the basis for effective working relationships among them after arrival in Tuzla.

POLAD Characteristics

The primary purpose of the POLAD is to assist the CG with the political/diplomatic aspects of his military responsibilities and to help him carry out his campaign plan successfully. While a POLAD's main focus must be the needs of the CG and the CMD GRP, he also has to work productively with the division's staff (particularly the G2, G3 and G5), the Joint Military Commission (JMC) chief, battalion task force commanders, heads of the multi-national brigades, and the support unit leaders such as the military intelligence (MI) battalion, the civil affairs (CAS) and civil military cooperation (CIMIC) battalion and the public affairs detachment.

The POLAD should further be available to share ideas and information with division personnel at all levels – enlisted, NCO, and officer – engaged in peacekeeping activities. The POLAD accompanies the CG on his frequent visits throughout the MND (N) area of operation (AO), as appropriate, and does extensive travel of his area in the AO in support of the CG and CMD GRP priorities.

POL/Mil Environment in MND (N) AO Bosnia and Herzegovina



A basic point, for those who will be deploying to Bosnia is that it is ***unlike any other country in Europe*** in comparison to its history and culture. This section will assist you in understanding this particular area of operation. All the great powers and religions of Europe overlap and combine in Bosnia. Whether it is the Roman Empire, the Empire of Charlemagne, the Ottoman-Turk, Austrian-Hungarian, or the great religions of Eastern Christianity, Western Christianity, Islam, or Judaism, they are all reflected in fabric of the political-military environment of Bosnia. It is a unique place. In a sense, you will be working in one of the great *seams* of Europe, one of the great borders of Europe. It is difficult to work in this area. It is an area that has been plagued with much conflict throughout history. Therefore, you need to be aware you are going into an area that is unlike any other part of Europe and it presents very many special challenges to you.

EARLY HISTORY

In the year 395 A.D., 1,600 years ago, Roman Emperor Theodosius of Rome, made the river Drina the dividing line between the Eastern and Western Regions of the Roman Empire. Everything west belonged to Rome. Everything east belonged to Constantinople. When you travel to Zvornik (Zah vor nick), stand and look at the Drina River; recognize that for 1,600 years, this river has been one of the key dividing lines between Eastern and Western Europe. It helps explain why this area has a lot of tension, conflict, and history.

The Serbian Nemanja Dynasty was created in the Balkans in the 12th-13th centuries (1100-1200 A.D.). The Ottoman Turks defeated the Serbian Dynasty on June 28, 1389. The defeat was a traumatic shock to the Serbians, from which in some respects, they have never truly recovered. Although that battle took place over 600 years ago, it still resonates in minds of the Serbian people and their leadership. In explaining to themselves why they lost to the Turks in 1389 and why they went from a situation where they were in charge of most of the Balkans, to where they were vassals to the Turks, they developed a number of myths that produce real consequences in terms of their politics and in how they view the people around them today.

The expansion of Ottoman Empire in the 14th-15th centuries (1300-1400 A.D.) resulted in a number of the southern Serbians converting to Islam and, today, their representatives are, of course, the Bosniacs.

In the 19th century (1804-1879 A.D.), the rise of Serbian Nationalism produced much tension in the Balkans, not unlike the rise of Germany as an organized state. It was during this period that Prussia and other states came together and organized into Germany in 1871 as a result of the Franco-Prussian War. While Germany was organizing, the Serbians were overthrowing the Ottomans and developing their independence. As modern Germany established in 1871, modern Serbia was establishing; concluding in 1879. When the Serbians received their independence in 1879, their first concern was to recover their prestige and lands had occupied in the 12th and 13th centuries. Today, when Serbians speak of the “Greater Serbia,” the aforementioned provides the origin: to recover the grandeur, glory, and the influence they enjoyed in the 12th, 13th, and the 19th centuries.

The Balkan Wars of 1912-13 helped spark World War I. Most people are familiar with the assassination of the Austrian Arch Duke Ferdinand in Sarajevo, on June 28, 1914. One month later, World War I began (1914-1918), during which the Serbians fought with the Allies

against Germany. However, what is significant here is that the assassination of Arch Duke Ferdinand, on June 28, was on the exact anniversary of the battle the Serbians lost with the Ottoman Turks in 1389 nearly 600 years earlier.

Between World Wars I and II, the kingdoms of Serbians, Croats, and Slovenes resulted in the birth of Yugoslavia in 1919. Yugoslavia is a term that means, “land of the Southern Slavs.” Most are familiar with the labels of “Serbs,” “Croats,” and the “Bosniacs,” but what is important here is that they are all Southern Slav people. They all have the same language and ethnic background but, by contrast, they have had different historical experiences.

Again, during World War II (1941-1945), the Serbians fought with the Allies against Germany. They suffered grievously. As a result of World War II, a gentleman by the name of Joseph Broz (half Croatian and half Slovene) rose to the top as one of the most successful of the partisan leaders against the Germans. He was known as “Tito.” He formed the modern Yugoslavia, which he ruled with an iron hand from 1945 until his death in 1980. During that period, Yugoslavia, with its six republics, was established. Bosnia was one of the six republics with two autonomous provinces.

Yugoslavia dominated their area in Eastern Europe. It was a peaceful time, although Tito was ruthless in the years just after World War II in establishing his new communist state. For the next 30 years (after 1950 when Tito had eliminated all his rivals), Yugoslavia enjoyed a fair amount of successful development. During that period, the Serbians, Bosniacs, and the Croats lived peacefully side by side although there was still ethnic tension that was submerged by Tito’s regime. Tito died in 1980.

In 1986 we see the emergence of Slobodan Milosevic. He seized upon the repressed ethnic tensions during the Tito’s years, as a way to vault himself into power. Milosevic was a politician, not a deep thinker. He was someone who was interested in power and in taking advantage of Serbian discontent, regarding how they were treated under Tito, to mature himself as the leader of Yugoslavia. Milosevic and his advisors believed in the “Greater Serbia” (the Greater Serbia, stemming from their kingdom in the 12th and 13th centuries, revived in the 19th century). Milosevic believed that Serbia should be the dominant power in the Yugoslav Republic and wherever the Serbian people were settled (in Bosnia or Croatia), they too should be incorporated into Serbia Proper. This was the political purpose behind what Milosevic was attempting to construct.

In 1991, the other republics of Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) began to fear the type of Yugoslavia Milosevic represented. They wanted to secede from Yugoslavia to become independent. Milosevic did not want this to occur. This argument led to the Bosnia War (1992-1995) with Slovenia the first to secede. Milosevic attempted to prevent them from doing so, but was repulsed. Macedonia seceded next, but Milosevic did not deter the secession. Serbians were not residing in either area. This was not the case when Bosnia followed suit.

When Bosnia declared itself independent in 1992, Milosevic launched a brutal campaign. The basic premise of Milosevic was, again, “wherever Serbians were living, that is part of Serbia, the Greater Serbia.” When the war began in Bosnia in the spring of 1992, the purpose

was to drive the Bosniacs out of the Drina River Valley to establish a corridor across the top of Bosnia into Croatia where large numbers of Serbians were living.

“Ethnic Cleansing” in Bosnia began in the Task Force Eagle’s AO. It started in the town of Bijelina (Be yah lee nah). Bijelina is a strategically located town at the junction of the Sava and Drina Rivers. Ethnic cleansing was an operation used by Milosevic and his allies that was supported by a combination of the Federal Yugoslav Army and para-military forces. The forces would move into a town, construct roadblocks, develop a list of key local Muslim leaders, intimidate or assassinate them, and then expel the non-Serbian people from the town. Again, the goals were to drive the Muslim population out of the Drina River Valley, make that area entirely Serbian for annexing into Serbia proper, and to create a corridor across the top of Bosnia to Croatia.



After going into Bijelina on April 1, 1992 (using a combination of para-military leaders and Yugoslavian Army soldiers), the forces deployed to Zvornik, then to Brcko (Burch ko), Bratunac (Brah tu notch), and then to Srebrenica (Sreb bre nee cha).

IN RECENT YEARS

When NATO forces deployed to the MND (N) AO, it is important to remember that the concept and implementation of Ethnic Cleansing began in this area, your AO, and it was one of the key attributes of this conflict. Further, Ethnic Cleansing for the Serbians meant blowing-up Bosniac churches, demolishing their schools, eliminating where they lived, and expelling them from the land.

In retaliation to the Serbians who inflicted grievous atrocities on the Bosniacs, the Bosniacs inflicted atrocities on the Serbians. The Croats also committed atrocities. All three parties are guilty of atrocities in the region; however, the key point is that offenses began with the Serbians. The Serbians carry the main burden of responsibility for this conflict.

The Dayton Peace Accords and the NATO-led IFOR in 1995 put an end to the fighting. It was a good demonstration of using military power, through NATO air strikes at the end of August and early September of 1995, and it renewed the diplomatic efforts to produce the Dayton Accords. The Accords were designed to end the war. It also provided for the legal framework for IFOR and SFOR to implement the agreement.

From the perspective of IFOR and SFOR implementation missions, the agreement contains a number of challenges in attempting to establish stability and security in Bosnia under an agreement that was designed to end a war. The Dayton Accords were primarily an agreement to end the war founded on another agreement between the Serbians, Croats, and Bosniacs that provided for an outside force be invited in to implement a peacekeeping agreement. This action makes us peacekeepers and peace enforcers...*not occupiers*.

The U.S. had a key role in bringing about the Dayton Accords that was a contrast from our original attitude toward this struggle. In the summer of 1992, then Secretary of State James Baker made the analysis that the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina was something for the Europeans to solve. The United States had been in Europe since the end of World War II, protecting them against the Warsaw Pact. It was a very real and credible threat. Now, nearly 50 years later, it was time for the Europeans to take on their own security responsibility. That was our policy in the spring and summer of 1992.

Over the next three years, the Europeans and UNPROFOR were unable to resolve the fighting. As the Bosnian conflict began to grow, we became very concerned about its potential impact on Italy, Germany, and other parts of Europe, to include its impact on the cohesion of the NATO alliance. American policy changed from a “hands-off” policy in 1992, to a policy of “active involvement” by the summer of 1995, to actually supervising the diplomacy to find a solution.

Many are familiar with the Kosovo Campaign in 1999 with the U.S. in the lead. We have a situation today where the intellectual, diplomatic, and military thrust to find security and stability in the Balkans is being developed, through coordination with our NATO Allies, by the United States. However, the result of our presence in Bosnia is that the U.S. is the dominant force in the Balkans. This is a significant shift. We have never been as prominent in this location as we are at present. It is a region that has predominantly been a preserve of Russia and a region that has been, traditionally, one of the most difficult places in Europe throughout history both politically and militarily. This is a new and unusual role for the U.S. and the current situation presents both dangers and opportunities.

Current Political Scene in BiH

The political parties were created in 1990 and 1991 within the Serb, Bosniac, and Croatian communities. Each party was created to represent a particular ethnic group, and prepare the ethnic group for war. The leadership of these parties today comes out of that experience. These are parties that still rely on their appeal from nationalist rhetoric and they have a headlock on the economies of their respective areas. These parties finance themselves through control of the telecommunications networks, the power networks, and through control of various businesses – trucking lines, quarries, or tile factories. What makes the parties strong is the fact they have disciplined leadership, they have a steady stream of financing coming from control of these businesses, and they can provide jobs in an economy where there is 80-90-percent employment.



Serbian Political Parties

There are two Serb political parties, the SDS and the PDG. The key political party for the Serbs is the SDS. The SDS was established in 1990 by those Serbs in Bosnia who shared Milosevic's idea of creating a "Greater Serbia." In addition to a political role, in 1990-91, the SDS played a paramilitary role. They served as the link between the Yugoslav Federal Army, the Serb villagers, and paramilitary in villages throughout Croatia and Bosnia. Beginning in the winter of 1990 and throughout 1991 to the spring of 1992, the SDS was actively engaged in distributing arms and establishing networks of resistance throughout Bosnia and Croatia. Today, the SDS has a more benign face. They were very successful in the November 2000 election. The president and vice president of the Republic of Serbska (RS) within Bosnia are from the SDS Party. They say that they will cooperate with the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. However, they still retain many very hard-line Serb elements. The PDP is headed by an economics professor from the University of Banja Luka, Mr. Mladen Ivanic, who is now the

Prime Minister of the RS. He emphasizes economics and takes a more moderate approach. The SDS, similar to the SDA (Bosniac), and the HDZ (Croat) is a strongly nationalist party.

Bosniac Political Parties

The one positive note observed during SFOR 7 was the SDP (a moderate reform party on the Bosniac side), which experienced a substantial growth. In Tuzla, for example where Task Force Eagle is located, the mayor during SFOR 7, Mr. Selim Beslagic, was very successful in winning back control of the Canton leadership in Tuzla from the SDA. Mr. Beslagic is now the president in Tuzla. The new mayor is also SDP. This also happened in Zenica, in the southern part of MND (M) AO and a number of the towns around Tuzla. The one area where there exists more moderate leadership is the Bosniac community. The Bosniac leadership desires to integrate into the rest of Europe.

Croat Political Parties

In the Croat community, the HDZ still dominates overwhelmingly. The moderate party, the NHI, has been unable to develop much stability. The former HDZ leader, Mr. Franjo Tudjman, died in December, 1999. However, the moderation, which we were hoping to find with the HDZ, has yet to take effect.

These parties still dominate the political process in Bosnia and MND (N) AO. This is why it is extremely difficult to precede with the civilian implementation at the same pace that we have been able to precede with the military implementation. We have not broken the “hammerlock” of these traditionalist parties on the political system. You will experience frustration in trying to support the international organizations in setting up a democratic system as these three parties continue to dominate.

A very important point for those units and personnel deploying to the AO is that the political process, although a democratic transition is underway, is still difficult to work because of the continuing influence of these three nationalist parties – SDS for the Serbs, SDA for the Bosniacs, and HDZ for the Croats. There have been six elections in Bosnia since IFOR arrived in December of 1995. SFOR 7 provided support to the municipal election in April of 2000. There were national elections in November of 2000, but we still have not broken the hold of the nationalist parties.

Politics and the Economy

One of the factors that has made it difficult to bring about political change is the depressed economy. In a depressed economy where jobs are scarce, the influence of the nationalist parties still remains. If you could revive the economy and develop solutions to the practical problems confronting the people in Bosnia (better schools, roads, jobs), you could take away the appeal and the legitimacy of the nationalist leaders. The appeal of the nationalist leaders is derived from their performance during the war and that they are still, supposedly, defending the nationalist goals of the three different communities. If one can open up the economy, you can create a new political agenda and produce leadership that can focus on practical problems vis relieving the problems of the war. Because progress has been slow with regards to the economy, this has been a difficult situation.

The exit of the three war leaders (Tudjman from Croatia, Milosevic from Serbia and Mr. Alija Izetbegovic who retired on the Bosniac side) theoretically opens up opportunity for more democratic space. These three leaders led their communities through the war, but they did not have the type of answers that would resolve the situation in this particular area – to move Bosnia to adopt a democratic political system, a free market economy, the rule of law, and integrate Bosnia into the rest of Europe. These gentlemen represented the past and supposedly were going to have an opportunity to move the democratic agenda forward. This is an objective for you to attempt to resolve while you are stationed in the AO.

Displaced Persons Refugee Return

It is also important to make comment about displaced persons and refugee return that is taking place in this political environment. One of the objectives MND (N) attempts to accomplish each day is to provide secure return of displaced persons and refugees. This is at the heart and soul of the Dayton Agreement.

Resettlement Perspectives

Bosniac: Porto - "Return"

Serbs: Stank - "Remain"

The Bosniacs are very much in favor of return. Ninety-five percent of them were expelled from the Drina River Valley. They want to go back home. Since the Bosniac goal of "return" works very well with our goal under Dayton to return, you will find yourself working very closely with the Bosniacs in supporting their returns. This will lead to the charge that SFOR is pro-Bosniac and that we are there primarily in support of Bosniac political aims and not paying sufficient attention to the aims and goals of the other two communities.

On the Serb side, the political leadership of the Serbs is taking the position of "Stank (Stonk)" or let us stay in place. They expelled the Bosniacs from the Drina River Valley. They feel if they stay, they will continue to dominate the towns up and down the valley and they will still maintain the "Serb

The Home Application and Return Process

The Office of the High Representative (OHR), in an attempt to provide an appropriate legal framework for the return of all three communities, established property legislation. This sets up a series of procedures where returnees go to a community, they file an application of ownership for their house (that application has to be processed and verified), they then go through a notification process for when they can move back on a step-by-step basis, then house cleaning and house repair, and eventually moving back. The housing commission in each community must approve this process and then it is signed-off by the mayor, so that this is an orderly and successful process. The problem is that some of these ownership claims are hard to determine, paperwork and affidavits are hard to come by, and bureaucrats imbedded in the local structure will take property applications and put them in a desk with months going by and no action. This process can result in a situation where there is a lot of delay and some people are consciously working against the system. Your J5 and your people working refugee returns must become experts in this process, in the law, and how it is being implemented in key communities where you are trying to achieve breakthroughs. This is one of the frustrating challenges of understanding the process, determining where it is broken and then to work with the IO Representatives in an appropriate way to fix it.

ness” of these towns. In these towns and villages in the Drina River Valley, the leadership dominates the media outlets. The media tells the people that if they return to the areas where the Bosniacs are now located, they will be mistreated. They will not have their legal rights, and they will not return to their homes. Many of the Serb people who are not interested in political problems and want to return are misinformed and are manipulated. One of the challenges you will have is to make sure the Serb people understand that SFOR is just as committed to the return of Serb refugees as it is for the Bosniacs and the Croats.

Another important tension you will have to deal with in the refugee return is “phased order” returns versus “spontaneous” returns. On the Bosniac side, there are zealots who want to return to their homes in the most expeditious manner possible. They minimize the security concerns their people may face if they come back too quickly. They resort to, sometimes, unscrupulous ways to ensure their security, when security arrangements have not been sufficiently emplaced. Although we are committed to supporting the return of all three communities, we are not committed to support “pell-mell” return, which will result in security problems that will set back the whole process. Working with the J5 and the IO representatives, SFOR supports the language of the Dayton Accords. Dayton calls for phased, orderly returns. That means setting up a process where the refugees and displaced people meet with the local authorities and work out a sensible schedule of return, which ensures their security and their re-integration into the community. You will receive a lot of pressure from people who do not want to go through that process, particularly where you are supporting a return to an area where local authorities refuse to honor their obligations under the Dayton Accords. You are then situated in a difficult position. For example, when the Bosniacs’ desire to return, the Serbs oppose them and the Bosniacs are told to be patient. It has been six years since they were expelled. How long can they be patient? It is a difficult situation for contingency forces.

Hard Spots/Focus Areas



Srebrenica

There are a few hard spots that may be unfamiliar to you but, after you are there for a while, they will become as familiar to you as your hometowns and communities. Srebrenica (Sreb bree neech ya), aside from Sarajevo, is probably the most well-known town in Bosnia because of the terrible atrocity that took place there in the summer 1995. Serbian forces over-ran this area and participated in the execution of an estimated 6-8,000 Bosniac men and boys. This massacre was one of the events that galvanized the American leadership to decide that the U.S. had to become involved in finding a solution to the Bosnian War. Therefore, to our policymakers in Washington D.C., Srebrenica resonates tremendously.

People from Washington D.C. have an interest in the daily events of the AO that normally is out of proportion to its actual importance in contrast to what is actually occurring. However, there is a need to be prepared for the fact that nearly every single visitor, uniformed or civilian, that comes from Washington D.C. to Eagle Base in Tuzla (almost all of them), want to go to Srebrenica. It becomes almost like Disneyland. You will become sick and tired with repeated tales of the sufferings of the Bosniacs at the hands of the Serbs. My comment here is not to lessen the horror of the event. However, you will resent the fact that people are telephoning you at 2 AM, because they heard that somebody threw a brick through a window in a house in Srebrenica. I want to warn you that this comes with the territory. Be up to date on Srebrenica. On one hand, it is your curse because everyone wants to know, every day, what is occurring in the AO. It can also be a blessing because the AO has a high-level of attention. What you accomplish in your AO, in trying to resolve the situation in Srebrenica, will be noticed.

Bratunac

Bratunac (brah too notch) is a community about 10 minutes from Srebrenica. It is one of the key areas for hard-core Serb political leadership in the eastern RS (Republic of Serbska). The Serb “die-hards” in Bratunac, still believe in greater Serbia. Similar to the U.S. Civil War in the south where some refused to abandon the idea about what the war was about, so too are there people in Bratunac. They will hate you, they will want to harm you, and they are very much opposed to Dayton. You need to be aware of that, to address it, and you need to be effective in recognizing that these people are out there trying to block you at every stage. Fortunately, they are a small minority and there are ways to deal with them -- through the J5, the international organizations, through information operations, and the JMC. You can come to grips with obstructionists, but Bratunac will loom large in your work.

Bocinja Donja

Bocinja Donja (Bow seen-yah Doe nyah) is another very interesting area where a number of Muslim fundamentalists settled into what was a traditional Serb village in the western part of your AO. It is within the NORDPOL area, but it is under MND (N) AO (NORDPOL -- Nordic Polish Brigade assigned to MND (N)). During the Bosnian War, the West adopted an arms embargo against Yugoslavia to prevent the war from becoming worse. That worked to the advantage of the Serbs because they had access to the Federal Yugoslav Army’s armories. It worked to the disadvantage of the Bosniacs because they had no arms, resulting in their desperation for help. One of the places they got help, because they were Muslim, was Iran.

They got help, not only in terms of money and weapons, but also in terms of fighters. After the war, the Iranian influence and most Mujahadeen fighters were expelled through our efforts. Some of them stayed in Bocinja Donja. They have prevented the Serbs from returning to the area. It has become very important to SFOR, as part of our role to demonstrate that we are pro-Dayton and we serve the interest of all communities in providing security for returns, to demonstrate that we are just as committed to getting the Serb returnees back to Bocinja Donja as we are to getting the Bosniac returnees back to Srebrenica. Discussion was recently conducted with the Eagle Base POLAD for SFOR 8. The SFOR 8 POLAD stated that 180 Serbian housecleaners were preparing for their return for the first time. This is a huge change that must be continued.

During SFOR 6 and 7, we were deeply involved in supporting the civilian community's attempt to apply the property law. That meant that the Islamic Fundamentalist in Bocinja Donja had to move out of houses that they were illegally occupying, houses for which the Serb returnees had filed their applications properly. A good part of our effort during SFOR 7 was to support that effort to apply the property law in Bocinja Donja. We initially made a call on the local governor to ensure he understood our commitment to both sides. This was buttressed by the efforts of the NORDPOL commander (part of MND (N)), at the local level, and our J5. We tried to get the ministries of the confederation to take action by working with the SFOR representatives and Task Force Eagle Commander's personal reports to the SFOR Commander in Sarajevo to leverage that SFOR leadership as an enabler with the international leadership. It was a long process, but, eventually, it produced results. Here we are, six months later and the Islamic Fundamentalist are out and the Serb housecleaners are returning. So each SFOR moves the "peanut down the road," a little at a time. This type of effort will be one of the key focuses for follow-on units to continue.

Brcko

The last area to mention is Brcko (Burch Koe). One of the books on the reading list at the end of the newsletter is *To End a War*, by Richard Holbrooke. It describes the negotiations during the Dayton Peace Accords. The future of Brcko is one of the issues that almost "torpedoed" the Dayton Accords. It is located at that key junction on the banks of the Sava River between eastern and western parts of the RS where the decision was made that we would resolve the decision of Dayton through an arbitration award. That main arbitrator was an American lawyer and we have had an American diplomat stationed in Brcko since 1997 to implement this award with the support of a battalion commander from SFOR at Camp McGovern. The American responsibility for ensuring the arbitration award in Brcko and for ensuring the integration of that city into the rest of Bosnia has been a very heavy responsibility. Camp McGovern has been critical for security there, so has MND (N). This is one area you want to ensure progress continues.

Shaping the Local POL/MIL Environment: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)

The Importance of Personal Contacts and Relationships

Working with the Commander, Task Force Eagle (TFE), the CMD GRP, and the J-Staff, the POLAD developed a number of approaches for trying to shape the local environment in such a way that was consistent with Army peacekeeping doctrine and consistent with the requirement to stay in our “military lane.” The division developed TTPs to try and make things happen in the area of operation (AO). The Commanding General (CG) was only going to be on the ground for six to eight months, and it is critical that he knew the power and politics of the local populace. One way to bring about change is by establishing an effective personal relationship between the CG and key members of the division and the battalion to influence local leaders. Specifically, you need people to do things that they do not, sometimes, want to do. Also, you may need to help them do things that they would like to do but are afraid.

Understanding Local Power Structures: Where and How to Apply Pressure

Understand that the local power structure is critical. As a command and staff, you must become expert on the activities occurring in key communities. You must know more about these communities than anyone else so you know where and how to apply the pressure. You should become intimately involved in trying to analyze what is happening in these key towns. In this manner, your unit can influence positive change.

Crucial Role of Intelligence

The role of intelligence is absolutely pivotal. Intelligence helps your unit to be proactive rather than reactive. The CG has at his disposal excellent intelligence assets that can be integrated in calculated, tailored, and perceptive ways to achieve objectives. The assets can range from helicopters, to human intelligence (HUMINT), to video cameras. There are many useful lessons learned to help you accomplish your objectives and to be resourceful. Ensure these assets are used in a creative, effective, and careful manner. Every soldier is an intelligence collector. When the commander departs and visits soldiers and locals, he is a key intelligence collector. Normally, only one of the commanders can walk into the local canton governor’s office. The commander must have a debriefer, from the G/S2 shop, waiting for him when he returns to his office, to debrief him while his mind is still fresh. That will help support follow-up visits or it will help the incoming commander. If a debriefing is not conducted, the databases quickly get outdated. Ensure every time someone goes out they know what they’re looking for, a list of objectives, what questions to ask, and focus on certain aspects. The POLAD is a key player in assisting the CG to prepare for such events.

SFOR 7 operations in the AO involved gathering intelligence and leveraging the assets of the 3^d ACR, through their helicopters, their reconnaissance assets, and their conduct of reconnaissance patrols. The manner the CG, with the ACR, used those assets on intelligence missions to reassure, to collect information, to intimidate, and to expand our database was a classic example of using effective TTPs in peace implementation and peace enforcement.

Importance of Robust, Integrated IO Program

Having a robust and integrated information operations (IO) program can be another key factor in follow-on unit success. The CG of TFE for SFOR 7 directed the Chief of Staff to reside over the IO program that integrated psychological operations (PSYOPS) and Public Affairs. This resulted in a cohesive plan in which, across the division, personnel understood key messages for a particular week that the CG wanted to project to the local population. The CofS would update the messages each week for MND (N) to speak with an effective voice. The unit also used the CG and other members of the CMD GRP to deliver effective messages. Quite often, follow-on units will be scheduling press conferences with key members of the press at special times and for special purposes. Commanders use those forums to dispel bad information. IO staff sends the CG and the ADC to appear on talk shows. IO develops advertising for radio, TV, and billboards. Everything in that piece of information must support the basic themes and convey to the people at large what SFOR is doing in dispelling bad rumors. In this type of “pell-mell” environment, where the unit is implementing a peace accord, an effective information program is absolutely critical. SFOR 7 spent a lot of effort on this and it was a personal responsibility of the CofS. I would recommend you take the same approach during your rotation.

Use of Targeting Cells

The use of Targeting Cells in IO is another very effective technique for drawing on the resources across the division. A very important challenge the 49th AD had was supporting a refugee return and the massacre commemoration in Srebrenica. The CG directed the ADC to create a targeting cell that met every night for five weeks to develop information on how to influence the local populace through information. A valuable technique the division used was detailed planned steps and rehearsals using the local officials to ensure that this event was a success.

Coordination with International Organizations

Coordination, in this type of environment, is paramount. Coordination with IOs (international organizations) was very challenging. Follow-on units must work with the IOs because they have the lead on many of the issues the unit is trying to resolve. Important here to note is that the IOs don’t have our numbers of personnel, they don’t have the same resources, and they don’t work on our time schedule. Therefore, a unit will likely find itself in a situation where they are “leading from the rear,” in a supportive roll. The security aspects of Dayton have already been achieved in the AO. Follow-on units are currently supporting civilian agencies in refugee return, elections, and establishing the rule of law. IOs may have the lead but, again, do not have the resources, expertise, or personnel. Units must establish a solid rapport and learn how to be effective at coordination.

One of the actions SFOR 7 did for the IOs was to put together a robust rehearsal exercise for the international community in support of their commemoration event of the massacre at Srebrenic. Although the IOs had the lead for this particular event that involved 4-6,000 people, they did not have the resources, planning capability, or perspective to ensure success. SFOR 7 put together a planning exercise where the entire IO community was invited and walked through the entire event. The 49th shared the techniques of planning for this event and ensured all was

properly organized including follow-up. It was a highly effective contribution to the success of the memorial event.

Coordination with IPTF and Local Police Authorities

Coordination with United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the local police authorities is absolutely crucial. The responsibility for local security rests with the police, not SFOR. It requires units to create methods to influence and work with the local police through the IPTF. The unit must ensure that the local police operation functions effectively. The 49th's CG hosted several events at Eagle Base with all the regional police commanders from all three communities (Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian). SFOR 7 security priorities were discussed, and the CG had an opportunity to hear their security priorities. Most importantly, the CG established a network of relationships and associations with these key leaders in a less formal setting than the police commander's office. Events, such as this, are beneficial to ensure smooth events, such as the Srebrenica memorial event in July 2000.

Coordination with Serb/Bosniac/Croat Military

Coordination, of course, with Serb/Bosniac/Croat Military entities is absolutely critical. The chairman of the Joint Military Commission had the lead on these types of efforts during SFOR 7.

Coordination with SFOR

The CG used an effective technique in coordinating with the SFOR. When the division was working an issue at the local and regional levels with no resolution, the CG would direct the staff to draft a letter for the SFOR Commander in Sarajevo. The letter would explain the issue and request the SFOR Commander to assist by leveraging the military entities or the OHR. The letter would request the ministers, either in the RS or in the governmental structure, to forward the type of information and instructions that the 49th AD was trying to push up through our presence at the local and regional levels. The SFOR Commander was very responsive when he received these types of requests from the CG. Therefore, the CG worked at the AO level to push issues through the power structure to influence people to do what they agreed to under Dayton, while he enlisted the support of the SFOR Commander in Sarajevo to leverage government influence from the top down.

Concluding Thoughts

U.S. Army Peacekeeping Doctrine Works

From a POLAD perspective, U.S. Army peacekeeping doctrine is proven, standing the test of time in Bosnia. What IFOR and SFOR have accomplished on the military side of Dayton, according to one Croat governor, “is a miracle.” This particular AAR and other available TTP, developed from the previous IFOR and SFOR rotations, are rich with lessons and guidance. The standards of force protection, rules of engagement, and guidance for “staying in your military lane,” have become the standard for other military peacekeeping operations around the globe. UNPROFOR did not have a military doctrine that the U.S. Army has to govern its presence in Bosnia, and they failed miserably. As Australians deployed into East Timor, many elements of U.S. doctrine developed in Bosnia were adapted to complement the AO. This doctrine is tested and reliable.

MDMP is Critical: Don’t Leave Home Without It

The Military Decision-Making Process is an invaluable tool. It is like your American Express credit card, your Leatherman tool, or your Swiss Army knife; don’t leave home without it. You will be in a complex environment and information is difficult to acquire. *Use the MDMP.* It is easy to make mistakes in Bosnia and using the MDMP will prevent many mistakes.

Dayton Peace Agreement: Still the Best Chance for Peace and Stability

The Dayton Peace Agreement was designed to end the war, not necessarily to rebuild Bosnia. It is flawed; you will hear that often. Many will say that the Accord needs updating and revision. Do not be deterred by people who say that the Dayton Peace Accords are outdated and no longer relevant; it has not been fully implemented yet. However, the Accords do need some changes, but the most important requirement is to implement first and then work to make the necessary improvements. The Dayton Accords offer the best chance for peace and stability in BiH.

Restructure of SFOR Presence in BiH Will Continue

The restructure of SFOR’s presence in Bosnia will continue; accept it. From the day the first U.S. and NATO soldier crossed the Sava River Bridge, in December 1995, until today, the U.S. presence has been to complete the job done on the military side, complete it right, and come home. In December of 1995, there were more than 60,000 NATO troops, and more than 20,000 American troops. Now in early 2001, almost six years later, we have 20,000 NATO troops and approximately 4,200 American troops. This process of reduction will continue, because it is a sign of success. Every time we reduce, it means we are closer to end of mission and you should be constantly looking for ways to do our job more effectively as well as making sure our military presence is in balance with the task at hand.

SFOR Success Important for U.S. Leadership Role in Europe

SFOR's success is very important for the U.S. leadership role in Europe. U.S. policy went through a real evolution during the Bosnian War, from first not getting involved, to getting involved in a direct way. Our success in the Balkans will have a tremendous effect on America's ability to play a leadership role in Europe. We have learned that when large-scale war breaks out in Europe, it affects us. Many of our forefathers are in cemeteries in Europe because of those historical wars. One of the lessons our leadership took from World War II is that it is better to intervene, to prevent a conflict from becoming worse, rather than stand off and try to deal with it after it becomes huge. That is one of the reasons we are in Bosnia, to prevent something which threatens to undermine the security on a broader scale in Europe. Our success, in the Balkans, with the support of our NATO allies, will have a major impact on how the Europeans look at us and whether they have trust and confidence in our abilities to play an important security role in Europe.

SFOR Success Important for Future NATO Alliance

SFOR's success is important for the future NATO alliance. NATO, as you know, was established to deal with the Warsaw Pact Threat after World War II. This was a very real and enormously serious threat that we successfully met by creating the most successful political/military alliance in history -- NATO. That was then; this is now. For this alliance to continue, it has to be relevant to the Europe of today and not the Europe of the 1940s through 1980s. One of the ways that NATO is trying to be relevant to the security challenges of Europe, under American leadership, is not to deal with the Tank challenge in the Fulda Gap, but to develop the capability to prevent conflicts evolving from ethnic cultural political hatreds. This is NATO's first out-of-area effort in dealing with a conflict on the edges of Europe. If NATO is successful in Bosnia, it will enhance its ability to deal with other future security threats in Europe. They may be in North Africa, the Middle East, or the Caucasus. However, it doesn't mean we are going to get involved; it simply means we must be aware of them and, if U.S. policy instructs future deployments, that NATO will be successful. Therefore, for NATO, success in the Balkans enhances the potential of the alliance to become more relevant to security in Europe dealing with other potential threats and further linked to one of our great strategic goals in Europe -- NATO enlargement.

NATO enlargement is aimed at widening the circle of democratic societies in Europe on the premise that if these societies have free market economies, encourage the rule of law, and respect human rights, they are unlikely to go to war with each other. Further, we will not have a repeat of the 20th century when Europe was the most violent continent on this planet. NATO enlargement removes zones of instability; Poland, Hungary, and the Czechoslovakian Republic joined NATO, and there are a half dozen other countries that want to come in. The U.S. is the chief advocate for this expansion, and it is our vision that we have developed with our European friends. But for the Europeans to go along with this, they want to make sure we're (the U.S.) committed to the security of Europe. When we put our troops on the ground in the Balkans in 1995 and we committed diplomatic leadership to produce agreement, then the European countries began to support the NATO enlargement. NATO enlargement eliminates these zones of instability, and, finally, is the hedge against the major strategic challenge in Europe -- dealing with the post-Cold War Russia.

We want Russia to choose the West and democracy. If Russia does, the democratic, economic, and political stability in Western Europe will be tremendously advanced. If Russia does not choose the West, we could well have a situation in Russia that we saw in Germany between World Wars I and II. If you remember, we had a democratic government called the Weimar Republic, then the depression came along, the democrats were discredited, and Hitler became known. Some of the more evil aspects of Germany developed during that time and resulted in World War II. In Russia today, the future of democracy is very much in imbalance. We don't know where Mr. Vladimir Putin or his successors are going. If he should fail and old-line Russians come back, we will have a major challenge. NATO is our hedge against that.

By succeeding in the Balkans, we are going to advance NATO enlargement; we are going to have a tremendous impact on what course Russia chooses. That is one of the reasons why our forces are in the Balkans. There are tremendous implications at the local, operational, and strategic levels for our interests in Europe and the United States' role as a global power.

“Since the end of the Cold War, the political and military issues have become so complicated and inextricably linked, it is absolutely imperative that the State Department and Department of Defense have a close working relationship.”

-- Former Secretary of Defense William Perry

Top 10 Lessons

- **Fully integrate the POLAD into the command group.**
- **The POLAD should take part in all training events leading up to mobilization; but if that is not possible, the MRE and ADME are most important.**
- **Bosnia is a unique nation in Europe; all soldiers should be taught its history and culture as part of the pre-mobilization training.**
- **In all things, remember the “ethnic cleansing” began by the Serbs in MND (N) AO.**
- **Bosnia-Herzegovina currently has a depressed economy, so the influence of organized political parties and business firms is very influential.**
- **Resettlement is the goal, but “phased order” will be the norm. Spontaneous resettlement will not happen.**
- **Establish personnel relationships to effect change.**
- **Understanding the local political and cultural power structure is critical to accomplishing your goals.**
- **The role of HUMINT is absolutely pivotal.**
- **A robust and integrated IO program is essential.**

CHAPTER 4:

JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION (JMC)

The JMC is a special staff section that is responsible to the CG. It monitors the operations of the Entity Armed Forces (EAF) Commander and his units to ensure that they are in compliance with the Commander of Stabilization Force 7 (SFOR 7) Instruction to the Parties (ITP) as they relate to the military instructions of the Dayton Peace Accords. The JMC has, in the past, been called various titles from the JMC to the EAF chief of staff. The JMC chief wears many hats and serves many functions. He is the watchdog to ensure the EAF, the three militaries: the Serb, Croat, and Bosnian, are adhering to the SFOR policies and instructions in the ITP. The 49th Armor Division (49th AD) JMC did this with a rather robust section of 29 soldiers. The table of distribution and allowances (TDA) for SFOR 8 consisted of 30 soldiers. This chapter provides several tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that worked very well for SFOR 7.

Twenty-eight of the 29 soldiers of the JMC were members of either the Texas National Guard (full time or part time) or the 3^d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3^d ACR). The JMC staff went as a team. It had already been formed and trained together for at least 60 days going into the mission rehearsal exercise (MRE).

The JMC standing operating procedure (SOP) was the first comprehensively developed SOP. It was functionally organized and divided into subsections: the missions of the JMC. It discusses TTP and addresses division staff coordination. It was developed before, validated during, and refined following, the MRE. The SOP was further updated 30 days after transfer of authority (TOA) and again updated before the end of the rotation.

The 49th AD maximized training opportunities in May 1999 when the 49th AD underwent the leader training program (LTP). Concurrently, the 10th Mountain Division (10th MTN), which was SFOR 6, was undergoing its MRE. Therefore, the 49th inserted some troops into the 10th's JMC staff to get the benefit of the training. This also established a relationship with SFOR 6 that carried over throughout the 49th's preparation. The 49th contacted the 10th routinely to get updates, coordinated bi-monthly VTCs with SFOR 6, and leveraged personnel with knowledge from previous rotations.

After the TOA, the 49th AD was at fully operational capability (FOC). The JMC staff scripted all of its activities for the first 45 days in country. This is a key point that should be recommended to all future rotations. Scripting to section level of detail provides a "road map."



JMC HIGHLIGHTS

- Strong pre-deployment training & preparation:
 - Internal fill of JMC positions
 - SOP development and validation
 - Maximized training opportunities
 - FOC at TOA ---- "Coming off the Bench"
- Aggressive engagement of EAF & SFOR HQ
- Refinement of prescriptive documents
- Joint Military-Civil Projects (JIE5)
 - Integration on MND(N) staff
 - EAF & IC

Lessons Learned

However, be prepared to refine the plan. Further, all personal pass and leaves were programmed. Therefore, alternate personnel were synchronized into work plans.

Previous SFOR staffs stated that the EAFs are *generally* compliant. The 49th AD experienced the same because of daily aggressive actions with the EAFs to ensure compliance as well. Key to the successful compliance was the EAF liaison officers (LNOs) that were picked to represent the JMC and the COM SFOR. Follow-on units must ensure they are quality people and are well trained. Also, ensure LNOs are conducting their readings. They must be exercised to the requirements of their jobs and the units with which they deal. They must be stubbornly confident and able to stand their ground without fail. If asked a question, they must know the answer. If any of this does not happen, there will be problems. The EAF will require training. They are very amiable to the train-the-trainer concept and when there are changes in the CG's instruction to the parties. Follow-on JMCs must train the EAF on those changes. Failure to do this will result in various degrees of success in adhering to the standards.


The same attitude of aggressive engagement with the EAF should be used in dealing with SFOR Headquarters. SFOR Headquarters is a multi-National Headquarters, predominantly NATO. The NATO staff is made up of different cultures and backgrounds. Therefore, NATO has different ways of looking at requirements to include timelines. Be cognizant of this fact. The 49th AD dedicated one senior staff officer to be the one POC for SFOR, Headquarters. He was referred to as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Joint and Military Affairs (ACofS, JAMA). This streamlined completion of requirements from taskings sent by the JAMA to MND (N) with one POC for the action. It also established a trust that when we needed actions, policies or initiatives accepted, approved, and proliferated through SFOR Headquarters, we had established a means to get it approved quickly. Things just worked more efficiently this way.

In the JMC arena, there are two documents the 49th AD dealt with exclusively, in addition to a few fringe documents. These were considered prescriptive documents prescribing policy to the EAF. They are the COM SFOR ITP and SOP 3400, which is the restricted classified version with the details and criteria of the ITP. Periodically, they have to change. When they require revision, the most efficient way is to do it personally. Currently the ITP is on Change 18-1 with only nine SFORs. If one works in a JMC, expect to draft a change to these documents during your rotation.

Another document is the JMC handbook. The 49th realized that when there is a change to the ITP, there should also be a change to the handbook. The book was used as a document for company level and below. It was renamed as the ***Soldier's Handbook***, dealing with items a company commander, platoon leader, patrol leader, or individual soldier needs to know about the ITP in Bosnia. Other items reside in the ITP for the task force or division staff to deal with.

Thirty days following TOA, the 49th AD realized that the priority of effort for the division was on the civil aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). A quick mission analysis revealed some items the JMC could contribute to that priority of effort. All efforts needed integration with the rest of the division staff efforts, or specific sections depending on the action, and that anything the division did to support the civilian initiatives must have the EAF support for resources. What the division developed was the JMC, Information


Operations, Engineer, G5 Working Group (JIE5 WG – shaded darker in the attached graphic). The other sections are those dealt with routinely but were not regular members. The objectives of the JIE5 WG are simple. They were to support one of the CG's goals of facilitating returns and to rehabilitate the image of the EAFs with the international and local communities. This also helped with the image the EAFs had that kept some people from returning but refused because there was a local military



presence. The third objective was to foster continued cooperation among the entities. Therefore, they would work together on joint projects. The methodology was simple -- 49th's JMC identified the capabilities of the EAFs, which were mostly engineer expertise, equipment and manpower. In addition, by using the G5, the JMC learned what NGOs and PVOs were willing to donate money to projects in areas that were high priority to the international community in terms of returns. After all information was collected, the division would let us know if the project was realistic and feasible. The JMC would persuade the EAF commander to raise his hand in public, propose the project, do the necessary planning, and coordinate the project. The EAF would then move to the foreground and have it appear that they were doing the work. The successes were capitalized on through the International Organization (IO) campaign.

The desired end state is for an IO or local mayor to go to his EAF commander and “ask” for a road to be fixed. The EAF Commander would say that he has the equipment and manpower, but lacks the funds. The mayor would go to his canton governor to see what funds were available. Normally, there would be an NGO nearby to support the project. Then agreements would be reached on the project to repair the road. It functions this way now with the intent that SFOR will not be needed to “guide” this process in the future.

If you are a non-doctrinal staff section, you should complete at least one recon of Bosnia before the MRE. You need to have an agenda when you do the reconnaissance so that you come away with a plan to build your functional area and allocate the proper time and resources. The 49th AD's JMC figured out that it takes about three and a half days to adequately train a compliance chief in his individual skills. Therefore, follow-on JMCs should plan reconnaissances for about five days.




Key people must have clearances. The conduit for the JMC into the ACE for information concerning weapon storage sites and order of battle is through the G2 compliance cell. Where this cell works and whom they work for is a unit decision. The key point is that JMC key personnel must have clearances. Prepare for this well in advance.

The 49th AD JMC section deployed to Bosnia with a fixed battle rhythm. They developed the JMC section's battle rhythm before and validated it during the MRE. It was refined a couple of times up to deployment. This established battle rhythm reduced stress on the soldiers since they knew what to do and expect for the first 45 days. The fixed battle rhythm and the script referred to earlier were very helpful. When you know the end state and reduce the number of unknown factors, soldiers work better.

Each JMC chief needs to learn his job in detail and then teach the rest of the staff how to properly use him. This is hard to do because it is a non-doctrinal position and staff section. It is harder if you have never been in Bosnia and really hard if you are the JMC Chief trying to train several section chiefs with no Bosnia experience and they do not know their jobs. Therefore, JMCs and section chiefs must visit Bosnia.

Much coordination goes on between the three MNDs. Cross boundary operations require an assortment of coordination. This coordination is difficult, at best, when you consider the language differences of the three divisions, particularly the French, Italians and Germans. The SFOR 7 JMC established a rotation program of the three JMCs in each area on a monthly basis. At the monthly JAMA meeting, JMC personnel would be flown between each of the JMC areas paying great dividends in synchronizing many MND actions.

The entities understand how U.S. forces rotate. They know that when a new JMC deploys, standards may become somewhat relaxed simply because of the steep learning curve. They queue off of the last thing they were told. Therefore, if they contact the new JMC with a request and the new training and movement NCO or officer who happens to answer the phone that day doesn't know his job and does not strictly enforce the standards; you will have an element in your AOR that is not synchronized, causing problems. The reason is not because of malicious intent. It is simply because these people are not getting paid, have poorly maintained equipment, their morale is at rock bottom, and they are poorly trained. A new JMC will be tested and he best be prepared on the first day. Again, this emphasizes the importance of a 45-day script and a well-trained and established battle rhythm.



Stay in contact with the SFOR preceding and follow-on. It is important for the credibility of the SFOR and for the success of the mission for the JMC to know what projects the previous rotation was working. In unit planning, decide if previous projects should be gradually scrapped or taken to the next level. JMCs will not be graded by a set of concrete achievements accomplished during the deployment. Accept the fact that not all projects will be accomplished in six months. However, if the JMC departs Bosnia saying to itself that it took projects to the next level and established new initiatives, then the JMC's efforts can be considered a success.

An initiative was started recently to determine how to persuade the EAFs and the civil military structure into a common defense policy and a single unified command structure for the three EAFs. This initiative is in a concept phase now, but it is being discussed for the follow-on divisions. Therefore, it is important to stay in contact with the SFOR in front of you and behind you.

And lastly, here is a training timeline that the 49th's JMC used. The JMC targeted the MRE as the date to be FOC. In the center are the phases of stand-up. On the right are those processes starting with mission analysis through the development of the SOP, which was refined by the use of reconnaissances, and validating it during the MRE.

Top 10 Lessons


- **Success of the JMC was ensured by a willingness of the assigned personnel to work together.** This willingness was formulated by the team-building that took place during early formation of the staff section and the subsequent training the soldiers received.
- **We developed an SOP, and then trained to it.** We subsequently validated the SOP during the MRE and ADME.
- **Script out your first 45 days in country and keep to the plan.** Begin the mission with a playbook.
- **Choose your EAF LNOs wisely.** Train them to be hard and arrogant.
- **Dedicating a senior staff officer to the role of ACoS JAMA (SFOR LNO) paid dividends for us.** The technique ensured a single POC at SFOR HQ for joint and military affairs.
- **Compliance with the GFAP by the FWP allowed the division to focus on the civil aspects of the agreement.**
- **Travel to Bosnia multiple times during your preparation as the JMC chief.** Have an agenda to accomplish on each trip.
- **The JMC chief must learn the trade in detail and then teach the staff how to use you.**
- **The entities understand the rotational schedule of units into Bosnia.** They will queue off the last instructions. They will use the rotational schedule to their advantage. Do not let them play the seams of rotational change.
- **Stay in touch with your predecessor and successor SFOR rotational units.**

CHAPTER 5:

SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS


Prior to deployment, the 49th Armor Division (49th AD) was notified that Stabilization Forces 7 (SFOR 7) and, specifically, the Multinational Division - North (MND (N)), were to undergo restructuring. This process would result in a much smaller number of troops on the ground. To accomplish the goals and objectives set forth by the CG, the division needed to improve the synchronization process while orchestrating the endeavors of the five subordinate task forces. The following is a brief description of the process used by the 49th AD to accomplish their mission.

The process the 49th's staff used resulted in orders and implementing instructions (IMPINS) being produced very quickly. The division staff produced an order about every week, usually in enough time for the subordinate units to react and produce their own plan. The synchronization cell met every Monday. This cell was headed up by the Training and Exercises (TEX) Branch of the G3. The primary staff did not attend this meeting. They came into this process later. The sample focus timeline shown here indicates that during the Monday




meeting of week four (fourth week since the transfer of authority (TOA)), the working group was laying out the focus for week eight. Therefore, this is a process that worked five weeks out. The first step of this meeting was for the G2 and G5 to present an assessment of where the division presently was and how it progressed to that point. Once the working group determined the focus for that week, the TEX Branch would take that information and turn it into a decision briefing for the CofS on Wednesday. The CofS would provide any additional guidance and brief the CG during the Commander's Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIRs) update on Saturday. This would provide the CG the recommended focus by task and area so that he could give the staff his guidance, changes and approval. The CG's approval of the focus resulted in an order or IMPIN being produced Saturday evening giving every key task by battle group area for five weeks out. The staff would also check the planning focus for five weeks out to double-check our actions.

Here is a typical agenda for the Monday synchronization meeting. An analysis was conducted of the CofS's guidance from the previous week. Then the staff reviewed the weeks from the present to the focus week. This led to an analysis of the mid-range calendar and receipt of the G2 and G5 assessments. Training events, particularly the large-scale exercises, needed visibility since they used the same resources that were needed to conduct other operations. As an example, the 49th AD executed Rapid Resolve, a large-scale airborne operation. The staff also analyzed political rallies and demonstrations that were being held during this timeframe, then looked at longer term or about two to three months out. All of these issues were packaged and briefed to the CG during the CCIR update on Saturdays; the staff then received its guidance for the rest of the week.




The next step was to try and figure out how best to allocate the division's general support. One item of particular interest was supporting the ground force commander or the four battle groups that did not contain aviation assets. After the SFOR ground forces were restructured and reduced, it became apparent that the ground force commander required more aviation support. This would allow him the flexibility to cover as much ground as before the troop reduction without spreading his troops too thin. The method of deciding the level of support was what the staff called the 72- to 96-hour synchronization. The request went from the G3 TEX Branch to the G3 Operations cell a week out. Each day, the G-3 Plans would conduct a one-hour meeting and receive a G2 and G5 assessment, including a review of requests from the ground commanders. The plans staff would then allocate military intelligence (MI), Civil Affairs (CA), and aviation (AVN) assets to the ground commanders and assign operational control (OPCON) of them in an IMPIN 72 hours out. This was enough time for the ground commander to reallocate to his subordinates and publish his own order.



The staff checked the priority of effort to ensure units were doing what was requested or ordered for action during previous weeks. The staff also analyzed the current operations assessment reports to see if these actions met the CG's objectives to determine if the desired end states were being achieved.

The plans staff analyzed the IO plan to synchronize the current planning week and the weeks leading up to that. The plans staff would check the other staff recommendations for additional meetings or bilateral meetings (BILATS) being recommended by the JMC during this time.

Here is an example of one of the tracking tools the 49th's plans staff developed during this process. It shows week six events while in week four of execution. During week six, the division planned to conduct Operation ESSENTIAL HARVEST, a weapons buy-back program, and an aviation range fire. The range was being conducted with the Nordic-Polish (NORDPOL) Brigade. Local elections were also scheduled during this time. The plans section had a mission analysis briefing to do along with developing a plan for Rapid Resolve. The JMC had two bilaterals scheduled. The Joint Visitors Bureau (JVB) was an ARTEP task. All staff personnel needed to understand the impact that VIPs have on daily operations. The division briefed 352 VIPs in the eight months, ranging from brigadier generals, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, senators, to SFOR 11 visitors. This can be a distraction; therefore, the JVB needs to closely synchronize their calendars with the G3 and other staff.



COL Patterson


“Many people will contact your G3 and say that they want to come over. The same thing happens with your G1. The baseline that the 49th used is to ask if it is necessary for the Army and is it good for the mission, future missions, or the 49th AD. If all of the above answers were yes, then we would consider it. Then it would have to go through the country clearance process. You will be inundated with requests for visits. The CofS has the power to turn off any request of two-star and below. Above this level, they were coming and you made the arrangements. The point is that visits need to be managed and sometimes moved from one window to another if you have operations and issues to deal with. And we are not just talking about U. S. visits, but multi-national. So you have to be diplomatic in the way you handle these requests.”

LTC Hamilton

“This calendar also helps us coordinate potential distracters at the division level so that we could reallocate resources if necessary. This would allow us to buffer the ground commanders from training events or competitor events from adversely affecting them. These commanders own a piece of dirt with limited troops to run it and if he has an airborne training event in his AOR, we could reallocate resources for this at our level so that the ground commander would not have his soldiers tied up trying to secure the drop zone (DZ). Since this process was accomplished many weeks out, we could get the ground force commander to give us


his assessment of the event as possibly detrimental long term to his efforts and move the DZ. We would have a calendar for each week during these briefings. We would also construct a mid-range calendar that would give a slightly larger perspective of what was happening.”

The G2/G5 would give the plans staff an assessment of the AOR. This was one of the best tools for determining priority of work for the G3 shop. Their first map was a depiction of potential hot spots. They would take their known and suspected events for each area and, knowing who was located there and their background, decide if this was an area of conflict. This would then lead us to determine where and how many patrols should be placed in any given area. They would also display these hot spots with the number of planned reconnaissance and surveillance patrols scheduled to go into this area. You may notice the term “presence patrols” is not used. Since all patrols, including convoy escorts, were being briefed, debriefed, and submitted their observations while outside the perimeter, they are now correctly called R&S patrols.



The assessments were generally accurate in that the eastern Republic of Srpska (RS) was the area that received most of the division’s attention. The typical red-amber-green method was used to depict those areas that needed much, some, or little attention for the focus week. Areas that were relatively quiet would not be colored.


The G3 current operations section would track all patrols going into these focus areas and could brief the CG and CofS on the number of patrols and assessment of their actions. Again, using the green-amber-red methodology, the G3 would brief the CG that a given sector was green meaning three or more patrols were going into this area. An amber status meant two patrols. Red meant that one or less patrols of some type, even air or wheels, were going into this focus area. If a focus area was amber for two or three days in a row, the G3 could also advise the CG that a potential hot spot in an objective area was not getting sufficient attention (as analyzed by the staff) by some ground force commander. The CG would have a conference call every day with these commanders and would tell them that we needed more activity to maintain safety and security.



The division key tasks were the main focus items for everyone in the division. This was updated weekly and was briefed during the CCIR brief on Saturdays. Monitoring and supporting the returns of any displaced persons was usually the number one key task. After we had been in country for 30 days, we dealt with the municipal elections and, for a while, the elections were the number one key task. Framework operations were always on this slide as something we always did.

After all of the previous slides were briefed, the plans staff developed the unit focus tasks by battle group. This listed all of the specific focus tasks given to each battle group for their AO. If an item impacted on the ground force commander, the plans staff tried to list it on this slide. This tool helped us track which battle group may be getting over-tasked. The G3 Plans also tried to pull as much information out of SFOR HQ as to whom they were sending into the division's AOR. SFOR would routinely send teams of German soldiers into our AOR somewhere to perform some type of reconstruction operation. The G3 would receive frantic calls about this because normally German soldiers were not in the AOR. This was one tool used for coordination and priority of work.

Unit Focus Tasks by BG



Week 7 (12 - 18 Feb 01)

- Reconnaissance and surveillance requirements
- Monitoring scheduled DPRE returns
- Combined training and operations requirements

Week 8 (19 - 25 Feb 01)

- Reconnaissance and surveillance requirements
- Monitoring scheduled DPRE returns
- Combined training and operations requirements

The aviation brigade was treated differently. They received their own slide of focus tasks. The aviation assets in MND (N) do not really belong to the CG. The operational reserve mission is a huge chunk of the aviation assets in MND (N) area. SFOR would send an OPORD directly to the aviation brigade because they thought that we did not really own those assets. Therefore, the G3 Plans would discover that air frames that were planned on for days had just been diverted to MND (SW) for some other mission. The good side of this is that now the division's pilots were being used in somebody else's AOR and it had eyes and ears located in places the division was not invited, enhancing situational awareness of the region. The 49th AD even tried to push its assets to multinational partners occasionally to accomplish this mission. This provided information back to the command group.

The division also singled out the engineers as a key asset along with the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU). The MSU is basically the Italian Carabinieri (police) along with Argentinean, Estonian, and several others. They were outstanding and assisted the 49th AD in many operations, most notably the *Women of Srebrenica Operation*, dealing with a large group of contested returns and house cleanings. The soldiers

Information Ops

- IO Plan for Focus Week
- Ads/Posters preview
- Radio/television coverage
- Pamphlets

were superb at minimizing friction by just being present. However, vigilance was required for they could also start problems. The MSU methodologies could intimidate both the EAFs and other nations providing soldiers/units to the MND (N). The AO the MSU entered determined if they could cause a problem. The NORDPOL battle group, for example, disliked having the MSU in their area. They took the MSU only when the division instructed them. The MSU taskings were allocated and coordinated at the synchronization meeting.

There was also a special operations contingent in-country. They are located in the MND (N) AOR, but are not an asset of the MND (N). They are the Joint Commission observers. Units can request that they look at something, but there is no guarantee that they will support. They rotate about every three months and their commander is a major. Some commanders will attend all of your meetings and offer their support and then the next commander may not acknowledge familiarization with your discussions.

The synchronization meetings also included the coordination of the IO plan. This is an area that took time to grasp and understand. Just as the 49th began to operate efficiently in IO, it rotated. During the synchronization meeting, staff discussed target audiences for radio and television shows and locations for posters to have the greatest impact. Messages to targets were discussed for the staff wanted to continually put out who our target audience was.

Top 10 Lessons

- **Use the one-third/two-thirds rule in your planning process.** Allow sufficient time for the brigades to reach when publishing OPODs/IMPINs.
- **Large-scale training events conducted in-county need visibility at all levels of the chain of command.**
- **As the end strength of Task Force Eagle has decreased, the importance of the role aviation assets play has increased.** Aviation allows the force to quickly respond to hot spots in the AOR. Part of the planning process (stationing of forces) must be a decision on where to accept risk.
- **Check past operations to ensure that the desired end state was met.** You may have to revisit previous operations to ensure end state has not slipped.
- **The staff must stay cognizant of visitors scheduled into the AO.** The JVB is the agency to control the scheduling of visitors into the AO.
- **The MSU was a great asset to use, but it too can cause problems.**
- **“R&S Patrols” has replaced “Presence Patrols” as the proper terminology.**
- **Track taskings to all battle groups.** Be cognizant of over-tasking a particular unit.
- **The aviation brigade may receive tasking directly from SFOR HQ.**
- **A thorough understanding of the IO plan is critical to the functioning of the G3 shop.** Synchronization meetings are a technique to ensure parallel actions and meet the commander’s intent.

Appendix A:

SUGGESTED READING LIST

➤ **Historical Background:**

- Noel, Malcolm. *Bosnia: A Short History*. New York: New York University Press, 1996.
- West, Rebecca. *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*. New York: Penguin Books, 1997.
- Andric, Ivo. *The Bridge On the Drina*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.
- Huntington, Samuel. *The Clash of Civilization: Remaking of the World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

➤ **Diplomacy:**

- Holbrooke, Richard. *To End a War*. New York: Harper and Collins, 1997.
- Zimmerman, Warren. *Origins of a Catastrophe*. New York: Random House, 1996.

➤ **Politics:** Silber, Laura and Little, Allan. *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*. New York: Penguin Books, 1995.

➤ **Serbia:**

- Judah, Tim. *The Serbs*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.
- Annulovic, Branimir. *Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide*.

➤ **Srebrenica:**

- Honig, Jan William and Both, Norbert. *Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime*. New York: Penguin Books, 1997.
- Rohde, David. *End Game*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.
- Sudetic, Chuck. *Blood and Vengeance*. New York: Penguin Books, 1998.

Appendix B:
COMPLETE BRIEFING SLIDES



Lessons Learned

SFOR MND-N Training
Support 5th Army Input



Lessons Learned

SFOR MND-N Training
Support 5th Army Input



5A Some Lessons Learned



- Training support “Team of Teams”
 - Corps: Training Plan approval, adjustments as necessary. Senior Leader Mentoring, Exercise Infrastructure and Role Players. Coordinate for non-standard SMEs
 - CONUSA: Training Plan Development, Peer Mentoring, Observer-Controller/Trainer
 - BCTP: SMEs and O/Cs; lead on PKO Seminar & MRE
 - TRW: Scenario Development ICW Corps and CONUSA
- Command Group Roles and Processes
 - Lack of detailed/any higher guidance (Derived Missions)
 - Forming vision; forming “Inner Circle”
 - Unfamiliar terms; out of comfort zone; defining roles
 - Clearly communicating the vision
 - Resetting the staff azimuth when not on track

Lessons Learned



5A Some More Lessons Learned



- **Change in Staff Structure Impacts Synchronization**
 - New Agencies (JMC, IO, MAC, G2 Compliance, POLAD)
 - New Functions (IO, Negotiations, Civil Support Planning)
- **MDMP and the “MND-N Thought Process”**
- **Integrating “Soft BOS”; may be operational lead**
 - Information Operations and Non-lethal targeting
 - Force Protection is a State of Mind
- **NG Div Manning: need ADSW plus-up early**
- **Bosnia Recon; critical for MI and Ops/Plans**
 - Detailed Objectives for every Recon
 - Dissemination of Trip Report/Recon Debrief
- **Continuity of Scenarios key to closure**
 - Each Ex must have D-72 events for Current Ops Awareness at STARTEX

Lessons Learned



5A Command and Control



- **Planning (MDMP/MND(N)-TP):**
 - LTP focus: 18 hr. workshop plus two vignettes
 - By-name ID and Stabilize planners
 - Develop briefing formats for CG approval
 - Orders production IAW FM 101-5.
- **Execution (Operations):**
 - Variety of SOPs; must sort out, review, and modify MND-N SOP to suit needs then train to that standard
 - Major Trng Objectives for STAFFEXs
 - Battle Tracking and Information Management TTP
 - CCIR: Shaping to CG needs and staff focus to meet needs in a timely manner.
 - Training on CCIR requirements.
 - Synchronization of existing and NEW BOS
 - Force Protection, IO, JMC

Lessons Learned



5A Intelligence BOS



- **Assist the G2 to build a team of teams from different MI Units**
 - **Use SFOR7 CD-ROM G2 SOPs**
 - **Assist G2 to develop team**
 - **Mediate team building**
- **Need to conduct computer support survey/needs**
 - **Need hardwire secure network/Trojan support**
 - **Design computer operator training program**
- **Training the G2 and MI Bn**
 - **Augmentation from Corps needed**
 - **Serve as BOS Chief during CONUSA led exercises**

Lessons Learned



5A O/T Train-up Requirements



- **Must understand Bosnia environment and operational constraints**
 - **Dayton accords:**
 - **Military SUPPORT to Civil Organizations. Rarely Lead**
 - **Instructions to the Parties and JMC Soldiers Guide**
 - **EAF Operators manual for executing GFAP requirements**
 - **JMC Soldiers handbook targets company level and below**
 - **MDMP and MND-N Thought Process**
 - **MDMP is the process. MND sets operational context**
 - **MND-N SOP.**
 - **No MTPs exist; tasks/conditions vary from METL**
 - **11 nations under OPCON. Mohammed must come to the mountain cause the mountain ain't movin' fast.**

Lessons Learned



5A FORCE PROTECTION

(FORCE PROTECTION WORKING GROUP)



PURPOSE

- To focus efforts on Force Protection issues and upon improvements to Force Protection postures.
- Minimize threats to Task Force Eagle soldiers.
- Assess / monitor Force Protection improvements at base camps.

PARTICIPANTS

- Attendees: CofS, PM, G1, G2, G2CI / Security, G3, G5, G6, XO 2ACR, JAG, DIVENG, DISCOM Rep, BCCA Rep, DIVSURG, All Unit LNOs, 629 MI BN Rep, Div Safety Officer, Div Fire Dept Rep, Mayor Rep, Brown and Root Rep , Hqs Cmdt, HHC MND(N) CDR, DCMC Rep , AF Command Gp Rep, Strike Main Rep, and Div Chaplain.

Lessons Learned



Lessons Learned

Train-Up Lessons Learned
III Corps



III CORPS TRAIN-UP SUSTAIN



- The training team for the 49th AD staff - BCTP, 5th Army, 1 CD, and III Corps, did a good job of getting the right people to assist the 49th AD in their train-up
- The 49th AD staff had a cooperative and flexible attitude
- Use of 49th AD personnel for 1 CD train-up provided the 49th AD with a cadre of subject matter experts for individual training

Lessons Learned



III CORPS TRAIN-UP IMPROVE



- When training with the NG, you can *NOT* use every weekend for operational training requirements
- The full-time personnel in the 49th AD were over-tasked
- Although there was an MOA between 5th Army, BCTP, and III Corps on who would do what for training, this agreement did not span the actual deployment process
- III Corps / Fort Hood specific -- The split between Mobilization / Reserve Affairs / Training & Support at the installation and Corps HQ level created confusion for the 49th AD

Lessons Learned



Lessons Learned

Train-Up Lessons Learned
BCTP



BCTP TRAIN-UP SUSTAIN



- **Progressive and linked collective training.**
- **Early establishment of the primary team.**
- **Early teaming of trainers.**
- **Basic Staff Procedures and Responsibilities.**

Lessons Learned



Lessons Learned

Train-Up Lessons Learned
3d ACR



3d ACR - TRAIN UP SUSTAIN



- IRT, CO/TRP STX, SQDN/BN STX, and MRE sequence of pre-deployment training
- Base Camp TF Team integration prior to, and NLT, Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE)

Lessons Learned



Lessons Learned

Mobilization and Deployment



III CORPS

Mobilization / Deployment SUSTAIN



- Initial SRP process - unit average 1.5 days
- Soldier support - movies, recreation center, etc.
- Unit involvement in mobilization process - validation, records, etc.

Lessons Learned



III CORPS

Mobilization / Deployment

IMPROVE



- Consolidate SRP in one building
- Unknown Requirements
 - Military Working Dogs (prior notification, housing, transportation)
 - Active Duty Units (information flow, validation, manifesting)
 - Demobilization of Non-Deployable soldiers
- Short Mob Times - HIV Results & Eyeglasses

Lessons Learned



AGTX

Mobilization / Deployment SUSTAIN



- Maximize screening SRPs
- Mobilization orders process
- Request = AGTX-->NGB-->FORSCOM-->DA Orders =

DA-->FORSCOM-->1A/5A-->III Corps-->SFOR7-->Cut indiv
soldier orders
- “Relief in Place” mentality

Lessons Learned



AGTX

Mobilization / Deployment IMPROVE



- “Deployment Orders” / Temporary Change of Station (TCS)
 - What Cmd is responsible to cut?
 - Necessary fund sites
- Know the constraints
 - Previously mobilized soldiers (cannot be mobilized under a PSRC twice)
 - Lautenberg Amendment
- Assemble the mobilization team early

Lessons Learned



FINANCE SUSTAIN



- **SUCSESSES**

- **SRP'S**

- **ONE ON ONE WITH SOLDIERS**

- **BRIEFED ON PAY ENTITLEMENTS**

- **MOBILIZATION SITE**

- **ACCESS TO THE PAYROLL SYSTEM**

- **BRIEFED SOLDIERS ON 1ST PAYCHECK**

- **FINALIZED PAYROLL PROCESSING**

Lessons Learned



FINANCE IMPROVE



- **SRP'S**

- **INCOMPLETE PAPERWORK IN MOB FILES**
- **FULL BRIEF TO ENTIRE UNIT AND FAMILIES**

- **MOBILIZATION**

- **NEED TIME AT HOME STATION PRIOR TO SOLDIERS GOING TO MOB STATION**
- **SOLDIERS NEED ALL ORDERS TO PROCESS PROPERLY**

Lessons Learned



G1 Mobilization / Deployment SUSTAIN



- Mobilization Plan / Execution
- Troop Movement Flexibility
- Commo w/Advance Elements

Lessons Learned



G1 Mobilization / Deployment IMPROVE



- Use of Built-in Lag Time
- Final Purge of Non-Deployers

Lessons Learned



G3 Mobilization / Deployment SUSTAIN



- Deployment Rehearsals
- Mobilization Station Tracking Cell
- In-Country Tracking Cell (BiH and Port)

Lessons Learned



G4 Mobilization / Deployment SUSTAIN



- **Sea Port of Embarkation /Debarkation (SPOE/D) operations**
- **Mission Rehearsal Exercise deployment/ re-Deployment operations**
- **Unit movement operations to SPOE (Ground, Rail, Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Ops)**

Lessons Learned



G4 Mobilization / Deployment IMPROVE



- Logistics recon
- Force Tracking Cell operations
- Establishing deployment UIC/DODAACs and SPBS-R baseline

Lessons Learned



Lessons Learned

Mission Execution
Operational Events



WOMEN OF SREBRENICA

Visit to Potocari - 11 Jul 00



- Identification of Problem Makers/Solvers
- Targeting Process/IO
- Identification of Weapons Caches
- Incorporation of Local/Regional/National Officials
- Incorporate all assets of MND(N) and SFOR (ie. MSU)

Lessons Learned



BRATUNAC

Stoning Incident - 11 May 00



- Wake-up call for the Women of Srebrenica
- Brief-back from unit is a must
- Education in role of certain International Organizations
- How to deal with IC officials
- Entire event was set up and well planned by B-Serbs

Lessons Learned

SECTORS

US

RUSSIAN

TURK

NORDPOL

**MND(N), SFOR 7
WEEKLY ROLL-UP 07MAY00-13MAY00****KOZLUK 11 MAY 00:**

Two unknown men shot two B-Serbs at the Basta restaurant. One victim died.

RT. NEW JERSEY 11 MAY 00:

30 people blocked road because local power was turned off.

SOCKOVAC 10 MAY 00

An explosion destroyed a B-Serb's building at 0245. The owner believes it was the owner of Cezar night club responsible for the explosion.

RT. SPARROW 08 MAY 00


Drunk local man harassed SFOR soldiers.

BRATUNAC 11 MAY 00

250+ people blocked Rt. Oregon protesting visit by Women of Srebrenica. Rocks were thrown at the busses. One SFOR soldier and 3 women on the bus were injured. Busses left the area. Currently, 27 B-Serbs under investigation for protest.

BREZEVO POLJE 10 MAY00:

Enterijer Construction CO. tried to rebuild three Bosniac homes. The workers encountered towns people demonstrated at the site; workers left unharmed.





JOINT PROJECTS



- Celic Bridge
- Besici Bridge
- Mackovac Bridge
- Brvnik Road

Lessons Learned



CROSS-BOUNDARY OPS



- MND(N) Battle Groups
- OPRES
- MSU
- Joint Resolve
- Rapid Resolve

Lessons Learned



JCO HOUSE ATTACK



- Response Time of QRF was outstanding
- Location of the house was questionable
- IO Campaign
- Immediate response to Regional Police Chief

Lessons Learned



OPERATION HARVEST



- Very successful TTPs at Task Force Level
- IO Campaign is Critical
- Get EAF Involved (Its Their Program)

Lessons Learned



LOCAL ELECTIONS



- **Phase I (Pre-Election)**
 - **Planning**
 - **IO**
 - **Focus Areas**
- **Phase Two (Election Day)**
 - **Discreet Presence**
 - **Heavy Response Capability**
 - **Monitor PDSS (OSCE etc)**
- **Phase III (Election Implementation)**
 - **Long Process**
 - **Maintain Pressure on Officials**

Lessons Learned



STANDARDS SUSTAIN



Standards...Cause and Effect

- Optimized a safety mind set for all soldiers
- Kept soldiers mission oriented and focused at all times
- SFOR 7 soldiers' appearance second to none--stated by all CSM VIP visitors.
- Soldiers always in proper uniform and displayed exemplary bearing.

Lessons Learned



STANDARDS SUSTAIN



Standards...Cause and Effect

- SFOR 7 soldiers had no accidental weapons discharges.....no other rotation accomplished this feat.
- SFOR 7 soldiers through hard work, embraced the Standards and expected all others entering our AO to do the same.

Lessons Learned



STANDARDS IMPROVE



- All soldiers under TFE, regardless of branch fall under the TFE commander and one set of standards
- Civilians wearing military uniforms adhere to the 670-1 uniform policy which also includes grooming.
- The TFE CSM have earlier visibility on MWR programs and recommendations on events specific to his soldiers.....prior to deployment.

Lessons Learned



Lessons Learned

Mission Execution
BOS Elements



JMC HIGHLIGHTS




- Strong pre-deployment training & preparation:
 - Internal fill of JMC positions
 - SOP development and validation
 - Maximized training opportunities
 - FOC at TOA ---- “Coming off the Bench”
- Aggressive engagement of EAF & SFOR HQ
- Refinement of prescriptive documents
- Joint Military-Civil Projects (JIE5)
 - Integration on MND(N) staff
 - EAF & IC

Lessons Learned



JIE5 Working Group



Leverages JMC's Administrative Resources



JMC MINEFIELDS



- Pre-deployment recons
- Clearances / ACE access
- Passbacks
- Battle Rhythm
- Staff integration (internal & external)
- EAF leverage MND(N) rotation rhythm


Lessons Learned



TRAINING TIMELINE



JMC Staff Process





G1 MISSION EXECUTION SUSTAIN



- Strong Team / Focused Efforts
- Good Relations/Commo w/G-1 Interests (MWR, IG, EEO, Safety, Chap, Medical)
- Strict Personnel Accountability

Lessons Learned



G1 MISSION EXECUTION IMPROVE



- **Units' Adherence to Command Policies (85% Rule, Pass and Leave, Release from Theatre, Soldier Discipline)**
- **Increase Personal Visits to Units in Country**
- **Interaction w/PSB (In/Out Processing Resp, Personnel Actions, etc)**
- **Tracking of Medical Evacuees/Interaction w/MedEagle (LODs, Surgeries, etc)**

Lessons Learned



G2 MISSION EXECUTION SUSTAIN



- IBOS CONFERENCE AND STAFF INTELLIGENCE TRAINING MODULE
- INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS
- INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE TARGETING PROCESS
- ACE ORGANIZATION
- NATIONAL SUPPORT TO TF EAGLE

Lessons Learned



G2 MISSION EXECUTION IMPROVE



- HUMINT TRAINING
- INTEGRATION OF INTELLIGENCE ASSETS WITH IN THE TF
- SECURITY TRAINING & CLEARANCES
- COLLECTION TASKING AND MANAGEMENT
- DEDICATED IMINT ASSETS

Lessons Learned



G3 MISSION EXECUTION SUSTAIN



- Information flow system (use of spot report, RTO takes message, BTL CPT directs distribution, etc)
- Twelve-hour shift. Although a long day, most effective system to distribute workload and personnel
- Manning roster. Although section staffing may seem large, it is required to handle workload; Offset losses to guard, pass and leave; And allow soldiers time off.
- The battle update brief (bub) briefing structure which allows each individual section to brief.

Lessons Learned



G3 MISSION EXECUTION IMPROVE



- Involvement of G3 OPS in all operations.
- Cross training between night and day shifts
- Radio communications between all task forces
- BDI was not a fielding but an experiment that was not properly staffed
- The command and or staff relationship between MND(N), SFOR HQ, USAREUR, and EUCOM was not always clear.

Lessons Learned



G4 MISSION EXECUTION SUSTAIN



- Establishing rotation objectives
- Close coordination with Multinational partners
- Multinational Support Cell operations

Lessons Learned



G4 MISSION EXECUTION IMPROVE



- Property accountability (standardized TDA)
- Logistics STAMIS connectivity repairs
- Procedures for Awards Fee Evaluation Board

Lessons Learned



G5 MISSION EXECUTION SUSTAIN



- **G2/G3/G5 Cooperation**
- **Relationship between G5 and heads of office**
- **Relationship between G5 and pOLAD**

Lessons Learned



G5 MISSION EXECUTION IMPROVE



- **CIMIC Participation in Training**
- **Civil-Military Operations During Training**
- **CIMIC Structure**

Lessons Learned



G6 MISSION EXECUTION SUSTAIN



- G6 infrastructure initiatives
- Frequency Management Initiative
- Commercialization of comms
- Conops Packages
- Redundancy in comms
- Seize the opportunity for experience in management of complex networks
- Computer Life Cycle Mgt

Lessons Learned



G6 MISSION EXECUTION SUSTAIN



- Info Mgt technology on the networks
- SC TACSAT

Lessons Learned



G6 MISSION EXECUTION IMPROVE



- Limit changes following each TOA (LSRs)
- Automation Contract (Mantech)
- Commercial Comms (Sprint) Contract
- RSR/LSR when contractors are involved
- Dealing with contractors
- Interoperability with SFOR and MND's
- SFOR Commercialization of comms
- SFOR Frequency Management procedures

Lessons Learned



G6 MISSION EXECUTION IMPROVE



- BDI
- Support by Multinational Signal Group (MSG)
- Control of funds by staff proponent
- AC Power reliability
- Handling of CCI

Lessons Learned



ENGINEER BRIGADE SUSTAIN



- Centralized Engineer support & C2 at Eagle Base
- EOD Teams located at Base Camps
- Selective monitoring for mine clearing
- Continue joint EAF and SFOR projects
- Continue BCCA project approval & management

Lessons Learned



ENGINEER BRIGADE IMPROVE



- Enhancement of TDA Engineer Equipment
- Armored Excavators
- Armored Dozers
- Improve secure communications
- Improve Engineer recon of theater prior to deployment

Lessons Learned



JVB SUSTAIN



- **Operational Flexibility**
- **System to plan and execute visits**
- **Country Clearance procedures**
- **Cross-Training personnel**

Lessons Learned



JVB IMPROVE



- **Radio/Telephone/Communications**
- **Ability to limit visit times**
- **Preparation time for visits**

Lessons Learned



PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUSTAIN



- **Weekly Command Information Magazine: The Talon**
- **PAO's at each Base Camp**
- **OCPA and Hometown Media Tours**

Lessons Learned



PUBLIC AFFAIRS IMPROVE



- Restructure PA assets in order to perform to full potential (See Attached).
- “Experienced” Print and Broadcast journalists are needed.
- Mission Rehearsal Exercise a “MUST” for MPADs.
- Update automation equipment, cameras and video editing equipment.
- Dedicated PA Officer for Information Operations.

Lessons Learned



INFORMATION OPERATIONS SUSTAIN



- **Maximum Utilization of the MND (N) Television Network and Television Show**
- **Increased Participation of Multi-National partners in the IO process through native language smart cards**
- **Maintenance of the Psyop Product Catalog Index**

Lessons Learned



INFORMATION OPERATIONS IMPROVE



- Integration and Participation of the CPIC in the IO Process
- Utilization of the expanded Radio Mir capabilities
- Subordinate Unit's participation in the IOWG Process

Lessons Learned



INSPECTOR GENERAL SUSTAIN



- Maintain good working relationship established with USAREUR IG office
- Maintain operational status of IGMET system
- Continue teaching and training Commanders on regulations and policies to ensure awareness

Lessons Learned



INSPECTOR GENERAL IMPROVE



- Teaching and training about the purpose and value of IG office
- Ensure all SFOR rotations have acting IGs at all base camps to ensure accessibility
- Educate Commander's on their responsibilities in Non-support cases

Lessons Learned



PMO SUSTAIN



- **Provost Marshal's Office enrolled in the Conversational Serbo-Croatian Class to embrace Police Community Relations and outreach.**
- **Maintain Weekly Liaison visits with Tuzla Canton # 3 Minister of Interior. Back Brief to Targeting Cell as required.**
- **Collaborative efforts among POLAD, Information Operations, and CPIC.**

Lessons Learned



PMO IMPROVE



- Rehearsal drills with documentation team
- Inadequate use of Military Working Dogs
- Weekly conference calls with MND(N) PM's

Lessons Learned



DIVISION SURGEON SUSTAIN



- Medical BOS representation on Division Planning Staff
- Integration of organic Role I CHS in all cross-boundary operations
- Completion of RC REFRAD physicals prior to redeployment

Lessons Learned



DIVISION SURGEON IMPROVE



- Medical support request flow
- Cross-boundary patient transfer procedures
- Medical TDY procedures & patient tracking

Lessons Learned



3d ACR MISSION EXECUTION SUSTAIN



- Skills learned during SFOR deployment (Media, COBs, NGOs, ROE, etc...) as they carry over to Mid to Hi intensity operations as well

Lessons Learned



3d ACR MISSION EXECUTION IMPROVE



- MND (N) HQs must include a dedicated full-time cell from the Reg't/BDE HQs to work redeployment and reintegration training issues
- Sustainment training opportunities during SFOR deployment:
 - Collective Aviation training below 200 AGL
 - Aviation training above team level
 - Ind/Crew served weapon ranges
 - Dedicated UCOFT/AGTS

Lessons Learned



AVIATION SUSTAIN



- **ATX was the best team building and training event for the Aviation Brigade in preparation for the SASO mission**

Lessons Learned



629TH MI BN SUSTAIN



- Early lock-in of I-BOS personnel "by-name"
- Duty-specific SFOR7 training plan for MI Bn soldiers
- Spirit of teamwork and cooperation during SFOR7 within I-BOS
- Continuous review of MI Bn intel support and processes
- Improved intel focus and asset use
- Improved intel support to multinational units
- Improved systems capabilities/standardization and facilities
- Integration of intel during key "surge" events

Lessons Learned



629TH MI BN IMPROVE



- Include MI Bn early in "baseline" events
- Access for MI Bn to organic year-round SECRET and SCI connectivity
- Access to in-country recons for key elements of the MI Bn
- Division planning regarding MI Bn assets
- Collection management system and collection plan
- Division-wide understanding of unique intel processes and requirements
- Pre-MRE interaction with Task Forces
- Acquisition of mission-enhancing equipment for THTs



249th SIGNAL BN SUSTAIN



- SC TACSAT - Integrated w/MSE @ MRE
- Continue integration AC/RC during IDT
- Emphasis on Convoy Operations - MRE
- Contingency Operation Packages
- MSE Improvements at Base Camps
- Continue Mission Analysis to reduce MSE
- Reconnaissance for key leaders

Lessons Learned



249th SIGNAL BN IMPROVE



- **Conduct make-up USAREUR drivers training**
- **Active duty passbacks - Admin paperwork**
- **Deploy augmentees until end of deployment**
- **Enhance TDA property (i.e., towbars)**
- **Upgrade Laptop computers, CONOPs, NCs**
- **NG Scrub Sourcing Strategy document - Class VII**

Lessons Learned



111th ENGR (BDOC) SUSTAIN



- **Level and Quality of AC support to training.**
- **Standards of Conduct, Appearance, and adherence to Force Protection Standards.**
- **Continual Utilization and Revision of SOPs.**

Lessons Learned



111th ENGR (BDOC) IMPROVE



- Conduct CTT at well resourced central location.
- Need more recon slots, standard should be every primary staff officer and Bn/Co. commander.
- Need Replacement apparatus.

Lessons Learned



Lessons Learned

Redeployment and
Demobilization



III CORPS SUSTAIN



DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS

- **Unit average: 1.5 Days / 12 hrs processing**
- **Successful due to:**
 - **149th PSB early return**
 - **Pre-planning between TX ARNG and III Corps**
 - **Unit support**
 - **Soldier focus on mission**

Lessons Learned



III CORPS SUSTAIN



- Quick processing turn around, for soldier's return to Home Station
- Bottled water vs. water buffalo
- 1CD Band & Honor Guard met the last three flights
- 49AD recreation activities, with donated beer, soda and water, band, and 49th soldier support center
- Tampa Bay Buccaneers Cheerleaders visit (BIG HIT)
- AAFES donations of Killeen Daily Herald, TVs, VCRs, videos, and goodie bags

Lessons Learned



HQ TXARNG SUSTAIN



- **Conduct as many demobilization tasks in-country as possible**
 - **Physicals / Exams / Medical screening**
 - **Briefings**
 - **Scrub records / build 214 databases**
- **Send the right people back on Torch Redeployment---149 PSB for SFOR7**
- **Multi-component, multi-layer demob team: III Corps (AC), 4003d GSU (USAR), AGTX (NG), 1st Cav Div (AC), TFTX / 49AD Rear (NG)**

Lessons Learned



HQ TXARNG SUSTAIN



- Greet every soldier who returns
- Work with the media to publicize the event
- Tracking REFRADs, medical evacuees, and emergency leaves (during the mission)

Lessons Learned



FINANCE SUSTAIN



- MINIMAL PAY PROBLEMS
- ACCESS TO PAYROLL SYSTEM
- DD FORMS 214 READILY AVAILABLE
- PROCESSED EFFICIENTLY

Lessons Learned



FINANCE IMPROVE



- **INCOMPLETE OR MISSING MOB FILES, ORDERS**
- **NO DEMOBILIZATION ORDERS**
- **NO TRAVEL ORDERS FOR FY 2001**
- **MEDICAL HOLD ORDERS NOT RECEIVED IN A SUFFICIENT TIME TO KEEP SOLDIER'S FROM INTERRUPTION IN PAY**

Lessons Learned



G1 REDEPLOY / DEMOB SUSTAIN



- Orderly Planning / Execution
- Coordination w/AGTX, Corps, and FORSCOM
- Contingency Plan for Final Actions

Lessons Learned



G1 REDEPLOY / DEMOB IMPROVE



- **Completion of Personnel Actions (Awards)**
- **Re-Deployment Load Plan - Must Retain Sufficient Materials to Cover Requirements**

Lessons Learned



G4 REDEPLOY / DEMOB SUSTAIN



- **Continual Unit Movement and HAZMAT training**
- **Efficient use of strategic movement assets**
- **Coordination of Demobilization/ Redeployment logistics funding through State levels versus unit**

Lessons Learned



G4 REDEPLOY / DEMOB IMPROVE



- **Military Transportation Movement Command(MTMC) and Terminal Transfer Brigade(TTB) coordination for the movement of equipment from SPOD to home stations**

Lessons Learned